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I. INTRODUCTION
With the Supreme Court decision Eldred v. Ashcroft the issue of the expanding boundaries
of intellectual property law emerges once again as a topic of wide debate. In Eldred a 7-2

majority of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Copyright Term
Extension Act (CTEA), also known as the “Sonny Bono Act”1 or “Mickey Mouse” Act.2
Brushing aside free speech issues3 the Court noted that demographic and technological reasons,
as well as the importance of harmonization with European copyright laws, provide a rational
basis for adding 20 years to the copyright life of authored works. Eldred illustrates the
overarching trend that has occurred over the past few decades: an expansive assignment of rights
in previously unregulated intellectual property material.
Economic analysis, with its concern for efficiency, has long provided the overarching
rationale for monopoly rights as a foundation of intellectual property systems: the investments of
authors and investors require legal protection because work of intellectual property is so easily
reproduced.4 Yet, economic analysis itself yields fundamental criticism on the expanding path of
1

The Act was dedicated to the memory of pop singer and Republican Congressman Sonny Bono who died in a
skiiing accident at Lake Tahoe. The author of “I got you babe” was a firm supporter of perpetual copyright laws.
Congress increased the term of copyright protection by twenty years, and honored Sonny Bono by naming this
legislation after him. However, “they also rejected many of the amendments he had offered, establishing that there
are limits on the type of sentimentality they are willing to engage in.” Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Symposium: The
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT LJ 651, 651
(2000).
2
The Act is informally also referred to as the “Mickey Mouse Act” because of the involvement of the Walt Disney
company. For Disney the CTEA extension was timely as it prevented its the first “Mickey Mouse” cartoons, such as
“Steamboat Willy,” from entering the public domain. The Disney Company and the Hollywood film industry
lobbied hard to clear the CTEA through Congress. Disney handed contributions to eight of the Senate bill’s 12
sponsors and to 10 of the of the House’s bill 13 sponsors. The National Republican Senatorial Committee received
$20,000 in unrestricted “soft money” following a visit of Disney Chairman Michael Esner to Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott. See Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, THE BOSTON GLOBE, August 29, 1999. Available at
<<http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-29/featurestory1.shtml>>. Helped
in part by Europe’s recent
harmonization to the term of life plus 70 years, and the commotion surrounding the Starr report, the Act passed
relatively unnoticed through Congress. However, popular backlash would follow shortly. See, e.g. Ian McPherson,
at <<http://www.netnacs.com/
Copyright Becomes A Tool of The Cartels, NETNACS. Available
downunder/archive/du-0016.htm>>; John Naughton, Mickey Mouse Threatens to Block all Ideas in Future, THE
OBSERVER, February 24, 2002. Available at <<http://www.observer.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,655907,00.html>>.
3
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that when Congress has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. For a critical review of the first amendment
issues in Eldred, see the weblog of Yale law school professor Jack Balkin: Mickey in Chains, Part II, or Why the
Court
Got
It
Wrong
in
Eldred
v.
Ashcroft.
Available
at
<<http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_balkin_archive.html#87500874>>. According to Balkin, the expansion
of intellectual property laws (horizontal: derivative rights, contraction of fair use,etc) has shrunk the built-in first
amendment protections, creating the need for heightened scrutiny, also on a vertical level (duration). Balkin
concludes that “[i]n the Courts eagerness to get rid of the first amendment claims in this case, it has created truly bad
law that will cause problems for freedom of expression for many years to come. This is simply a disastrous opinion
for free speech, and the Court should be ashamed of the shoddy job its done in this case.” See, also, Symposium,
Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1
(2002). See, generally on copyright and First Amendment issues, e.g., Edwin C. Baker, First Amendment Limits on
Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as The Air To Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at
the Supreme Court, 47 J. COP. SOC’Y. 317 (2000); Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright in the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. Rev. 1 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). On the future of constitutional law and copyright, see Pamela Samuelson,
The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COP. SOC’Y. (2003, forthcoming).
4
See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG STUD. 325
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property rights protection that intellectual property law has taken of late.5 In documenting the
social, economic and political processes that underlie legal change in intellectual property, this
Article illustrates the fundamental nexus between technological progress and intellectual
property. In doing so, I set out three basic claims on the process of legal change in intellectual
property.
First, rather than simply resulting from interest group pressure and rent-seeking, the
emergence of intellectual property rights is best described as a response to increasing economic
value and diminishing transaction costs, resulting from synergies between new technologies and
intellectual content. Second, the uncertainty as to the usefulness of technology in protecting or
copying content leads to increased efforts of legislative and judicial capture by both content
providers and consumers. The resulting social mechanism predicts a cyclical back and forth of
the legal allocation of use rights between producers and users. Third, as a matter of allocative
efficiency, there exists considerable friction between the ‘multi-component’ or complementary
nature of works and the continued extension of property right-protection to increasingly smaller
units of intellectual and scientific creation. Economic theory reveals the problematic societal
consequences that may develop in the wake of unbounded fragmentation of property rights.
This paper links the property rights-evolution in the realm of intellectual or information
goods to the synergy between technological advancements and intellectual property. The
expansion of intellectual property law is one of higher property activity, situated mainly in terms
of more “precision” in the allocation of the various novel uses of intellectual goods. Rather than
simply entailing a one-way distribution of rights to producers as an interest group, the evolution
of intellectual property rights can be identified as a progression towards a more explicit
assignment of rights in previously unregulated material. Overall, users and consumers have been
granted more limited but also more explicitly specified rights of use and defense with regard to
intellectual resources. Albeit determinstic, my rationalization of the process of intellectual
property law formation is not optimistic in nature. As a matter of allocative efficiency, this
Article provides a cautionary note with regard to the degree of fragmentation resulting from the
ongoing creation of property rights specifications in intellectual property.
(1989).
5
See, for example, Richard Posner’s criticism on the expansion of intellectual property law: “These rights keep
expanding without any solid information about why they're socially beneficial”. See, Declan McCullagh, Left Gets
Nod from Right on Copyright Law, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 20, 2002. The CTEA’s extention of copyright duration
to existing copyrighted work is one such focal point of the economists’s skeptisism. Because one “cannot give extra
incentives to a corpse”, economic reasoning falls short in providing a rationale for this aspect of the CTEA. In the
words of Lessig: “Gershwin isn’t going to write more music”. Steven Levy, Lawrence Lessig’s Supreme Showdown,
10.10 Wired Magazine (2002) (online at <<http://www. wired.com/wired/archive/10.10/lessig_pr.html>>).
Similarly, with regard to future works the extra incentive created by the CTEA are negligible. At an interest rate of
rate 6% the present value of every dollar in extra royalties in those 20 years is $0,0045. See Amicus Brief No. 01618 in support of petitioners, at p6. The Brief is composed by seventeen prominent economists, of which five
received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science. The Brief also refers to the concept of anticommons
fragmentation (p. 13). This issue is addressed further in Section IV of this Article. For a list of the various amici in
Eldred see Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft at <<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/legal.html>. Moreover, the
CTEA has salient distributional and political economy effects. The life cycles of authored work are of such nature
that of all works created 70 years ago 2% of those works account for all revenue of incoming royalties. If the CTEA
duration of protection was in force at the time of the creation of the Santa Clause figure, every department store
would today still pay royalties come Christmas time. A website has recently listed all renewals of classic 1923 books
that
are
now
kept
out
of
the
public
domain
by
the
CTEA.
See
<<http://www.kingkong.demon.co.uk/ccer/ccer.htm>>.
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Part II discusses the gradual expansion of intellectual property over time. It is held that the
increased role of property right allocation in society’s conception of intellectual goods responds
to changing underlying structural conditions. It is demonstrated how the impact of digital
technology on intellectual property rights fits the textbook example of the emergence of
“property rights” in the presence of increasing economic value and diminishing transaction costs.
Part II concludes with a description of the social mechanism by which change in intellectual
property law takes shape. Part III explores the possible societal ramifications of the proliferation
of intellectual property rights in relation to the economic concept of property fragmentation. This
part underscores the friction between the ‘multi-component’ or complementary nature of works
and the continued extension of property right-protection to increasingly smaller units of
intellectual and scientific creation. I explore fragmentation and complementarity (and the
presence of institutional safeguards) with regard to the three main intellectual property rights:
copyrights, patents and trademarks. The analysis is extended to a number of current issues in the
field of intellectual property, where property right protection has been established into areas that
were previously considered to be beyond the confines of intellectual property law. This Article
demonstrates that, as a matter of allocative efficiency, the economic model of fragmentation is
crucial to many of the contemporary issues of intellectual property law. These contemporary
issues include the emergence of patents on genetic information, the validity of business patents,
the scope of antitrust law for the regulation of the practices of copyright associations, the
justification of copyright defense doctrines, the case for unrestricted automated rights
management systems, and several other current issues in the intellectual property policy debate.

II. THE PROLIFERATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A.

Introduction

If one was pressed to describe the history of intellectual property law6 in one word, it would
not be hard to do. The word that comes to mind is “expansion”.7 Statutory and adjudicatory law6

In this Chapter intellectual property is defined as “nonphysical property which stems from, is identified as, and
whose value is based upon some idea or ideas. Furthermore, there must be some additional element of novelty.”
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 294 (1988).
7
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. The international intellectual property system was
recently strengthened and broadened by the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations whose intellectual
property component, the “TRIPS” agreement, builds on the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Negotiations, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), in Results of the Uruguay Round 6-19, 365-403
(GATT Secretariat ed., 1994). See, generally, S. Ricketson, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886 TO 1989 (1987); FICSOR MIHLY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE
INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002). On an international
level provisions of “national treatment” (identical rights to nationals of another Member State are as granted to one’s
own nationals) and “most-favored-nation treatment” (privileges granted by one Member State to another State must
be granted to all other WTO Member States) have added to the expansion of intellectual property right. See,
respectively, Articles 3 and 4 TRIPS Agreement. In the European Union the harmonization of national member state
laws, as a matter of procedure, has added to the strengthening of intellectual property rights in Europe. As Justice
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making initiatives have steadily resulted in the creation of new intellectual property rights and
the extension of existing doctrines of intellectual property right to subject matter previously
outside of the grab of intellectual property law.8
In the words of a leading commentator of intellectual property law: “There is currently a
strong trend to “propertize” everything in the realm of information. Intellectual property law is
expanding on an almost daily basis as new rights are created or existing rights are applied to give
intellectual property right owners rights that they never would have had in an earlier time.”9
This trend stretches across the entire domain of intellectual property rights, adjusting the
boundaries of copyright law,10 patent law,11 trademark law12, the enactment of “sui generis” or
special purpose intellectual property laws, including the protection of semiconductor chips,13 of
gathered information in the form of databases,14 industrial designs,15 and plant varieties. Such
Lenaerts explained, the European Commission’s harmonizing “up” (extension of protection) rather than “down” is a
natural result of the legislative process: “It is much easier to harmonize intellectual property rights up than down. No
one minds being given more rights than they had before, whereas people are apt to complain very seriously- raising
cries of destruction of property without compensation - if their rights are cut down.” Justice R. Jacob, Intellectual
Property - Industry’s Enemy, 5 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 253 (1996) (cited in GUY TRITTON,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE, p. 325, at note 68 (2002)). More on theories of legal change in Sections __.
Generally, on the international political process of copyright treaty-making, see M.M. BOGUSLAVSKII, COPYRIGHT
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS (1979).
8
See EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY (Cooper Dreyfuss, Rochelle et al. eds., 2001). With regard to patents the expansion has opened entirely
“new landscapes to the possibility of patents.” The patentability of software and business methods has made the
“impossible” possible, according to Merges. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577, 578,
581 (1999).
9
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, 898-99. Lemley illustrates the expansion frenzy in reference to the National
Basketball Association’s copyright claims in the scores of its games, copyright claims in architecture of homes, and
trademark infringement claims of property owners against postcards of city skylines. See also, e.g., Robert P.
Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
45 (2000): “As an increasing amount of society’s wealth is tied up in intangible assets, strong, clear property rights
can make a good deal of sense. But it is also possible to have too much of a good thing, and our society is in danger
of reaching that point.” (at p.45) (The authors hold that there are internal, teleological limits on the power of
Congress to create and extend intellectual property). With regard to copyrights, Elkin-Korin notes “if copyright law
had once created islands of information, which are subject to the sovereign control of copyright owners, these
islands are now turning into a continent leaving little available space in between.” Niva Elkin-Korin, It’s All About
Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information Landscape, 79, p. 84 in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Korin & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., 2002).
10
See, infra, following paragraph.
11
See, further in this Section.
12
See, further in this Section.
13
Semiconductor chips were recently awarded protection in the United States under the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-912. (Supp. IV 1986).
14
Although Feist limits copyright protection in factual compilations (Feist Pubs., Inc. V. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991), the developments thereafter have awarded stronger protection to database works. See J.H.
Reichman& P. Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Merges, 1874-1875
and notes 52-54 (citing Bloomberg’s attempts in fending off attempts of database owners to receive stronger
intellectual property on stock and commodity pricing); Shawn Zeller, From the K Street Corridor: Raw Data, 30
NAT’L J. 3028 (1998). See Article 10 TRIPS Agreement. Databases are protected “by reason of the selection or
arrangement of their contents.” A similar trend emerges in countries of the European Union. See European Directive
on Database Protection, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11March 1996 on the
legal protection of databases (O.J. No L 77 of 27.3.1996, p. 20.) The format, ordering and presentment of a database
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expansion implicates all but the most basic tenets of society: news, information, scientific data,16
entertainment, technology and so forth.
1. Copyright Law: Creators and Artists at the Wheel
Over the past two-hundred years of copyright history numerous statutory17 and adjudicatory
adjustments, have, almost without exception, resulted in an expansion of the legal protection of
authorship.
Copyright18 law duration has expanded from a renewable fourteen-year term to life of the
author plus seventy years after death.19 The limit of what is defined as copyrightable content is
continually being readjusted through moderations of the threshold of originality,20 and of other
authorship requirements.21 Copyright now protects sound recordings as distinct from the
underlying musical compositions.22 The control rights of copyright owners over the use of their
are covered by copyright law. The content of the database is not covered by copyright law, but might receive sui
generis protection (Belgian Cass. 11 mei 2001). However, introductory summaries of case law in legal databases are
protected by copyright law. (Vrz. Rb. Brussel, 28 juli 2000). See generally, Law of 31th of August 1998,
implementation of the European Directive of March 11, 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases (B.S., 14
November 1998).
15
This applies uniquely to the United States. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to
Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. & POL. 879 (1988).
16
In observing the increased erosion of the public domain, Robert Merges writes of “creeping propertization” in the
pure sciences, see Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research,
Summer 1996 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 145 (1996). See also ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1997) [Hereinafter NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE] .
17
For an overview, see Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275
(1989).
18
Copyright law covers a diverse subject-matter: novels, plays, symphonies, paintings, computer programs, sound
recordings, film, live performances, broadcastings, cable transmissions, etc. In this work we refer to all of these,
non-invention creations as “authored works” or “copyrighted material”.
19
In the United States the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 302, 90 STAT. 2541, 2572 (codified at 17
U.S.C. 302 (1994) substituted the renewable fourteen-year term (Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8
Anne, Ch. 21 (Eng.)) for the broader “life of the author plus 50 years” rule. The Sony Bono Copyright Term
Expansion Act harmonized the copyright term to the European Union standard of 70 years after death of the author.
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, H.R. 604, 105th Cong. 2 (1997), Sony Bono Copyright Term
Expansion Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). Compare, e.g., Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993
harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights O.J. L 290 , 24/11/1993. Implemented in
national legislation of EU member States, see, e.g., Article §2, 1, Belgian Act on Copyright Law and Related Rights,
30th of June 1994 (B.S., 27 July 1994).
20

On the development of a lower standard of originality, see Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard
for Copyright Law, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 193, 196-205 (2001) (discussing the relevant case law). Litrell links the lowered
standards of copyright protection to the rise of a romantic conception of authorship. On the romantic conception of
ownership see, infra, Section ___. However, a more romantic conception of authorship could also suggest that
standards of originality would be stricter. Before creativity is awarded the esteemed status of “authorship” it must be
of a nature that sets it apart from the rest of society’s productive activities. See Peter Jaszi (1991), Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L. J. 455.
21

On the erosion of the formal standards for copyright, see NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 345-51.

22

In the United States, see the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 302 (1994). The Rome and Phonograms
conventions originally extended copyright to performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasters. At the time,
the main concern was with protection of performers against “bootlegging” activities: the fixation and broadcasting
of performances without consent, as well as the reproduction of such fixations. See, also WIPO Performances and
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work have been bolstered, such as in the evolution of performance rights in copyrighted work,23
and the global convergence towards inalienable moral rights in copyrighted work.24 The sphere
of copyright law has expanded with each wave of technological advancement.25 The most recent
example is the applicability of copyright law to the digital renditions of intellectual content, and
the novel means of communicating that information, as implemented by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act and the European Union Information Society Directive.26 The prohibition of
circumvention technology27 and the judicial validation of shrinkwrap contracts can be viewed in
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT): Article 5 which extends the moral rights of attribution and integrity to performers of
live “aural” performances and phonogram recordings. See also Article 6 WPPT which bolsters the economic rights
of performers, defining them as “exclusive rights of authorizing.”
23

Lemley, Romantic Authorship, 887, with reference to Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 106, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 106(2) (1994)). With regard to public performance of sound recordings through digital
means see, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-39, 2, 109 Stat. 336. The
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 establishes an exclusive right to perform sound
recordings publicly by means of a digital audio transmission, and introduces a royalty right for digital performances,
downloading, uploading and streaming of digital transmissions. See 17 U.S.C. §114.

24

For an in-depth comparative discussion of this trend, see Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT.
L.J. 1 (1994) (notes 7-10 refer to adjudicatory innovations in the recognition of moral rights in copyrighted work).
For an economic explanation of moral rights, see Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral
Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997). Moral rights in Europe include,
for example, Belgian Act on Copyright Law and Related Rights, 30th of June 1994 (B.S., 27 July 1994). Article §1, 2
prescribes non-alienable moral rights of attribution, public divulgement, and non-modification.
25

For an overview, see, e.g., Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright
in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 719 (2000): “recent trends in copyright policy as applied to the digital
environment have resulted in a trend toward an unwarranted privatization of cyberspace and the information that
flows through it.” For a discussion of legislative s concerns with intellectual property protection in the digital era,
see European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology, C.O.M. (88) 172.
26

The NII White Paper, developed under the Clinton Administration, is a prime example of this trend. See The
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and
the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 2. See
likewise in Europe where the European Union Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights
in the information society, O.J. L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0010 - 00192001/29/EG). The Information Society Directive
harmonizes European copyright laws in the world of digital network and e-commerce. The directive extends the
rights of copyright holders to digital communication. See Article 3.1: “Member States shall provide authors with the
exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” The European Union Information Society Directive
(Dir. 2001/29/EC, [2001] O.L. 167) introduces a new “production right”. See Article 2,: “the exclusive right to
authorize or prohibit, direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means or in any form, in whole
or in part.” This right of production intends to cover all types of electronic and transient copying, especially on-line
and digital acts of reproduction and dissemination. This new production right is not limited by a “substantiality”
threshold - such as in the Database Directive (At 7(1) Database Directive) where a minimum amount of information
must be copied before the right of the database owner is infringed. The Information Society Directive also bolsters
the right of authors who have explicit right to authorize or prohibit the communication to the public of “any”
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means (Article 3). This “making available” right is
another step in the direction of enclosure of new technological uses of content.
27

The Digital Millenium Copyright Act creates a new species of copyright protection, also called “paracopyright”,
that prohibits not copying itself but the creation of various devices and technologies that might be used to facilitate
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light of this.28 The curtailment of the doctrine of fair use in the presence of on-line licensing
copying by circumventing copyright management devices. In doing so the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
introduces a considerable extension of copyright protection by rendering illegitimate the technological tools that
might act to circumvent copy protection (§ 1201), while also acknowledging the legitimacy of technical protection
schemes (§ 1202). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). In effect, these
“anticircumvention” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act change the terms of the traditional “arms”
race between copy protection and circumvention. “Once adopted by a right holder, these technological self-help
means are no longer vulnerable to circumventing technologies because these technologies are now prohibited by
law.” Niva Elkin-Korin, It’s All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information Landscape, 79, p. 84
in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Korin & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., 2002). A similar
restriction on circumvention technology is introduced in the European Union by Article 6 of the Information Society
Directive (Dir. 2001/29/EC, [2001] O.L. 16.) See also World Intellectual Property Organization, (WIPO), Copyright
Treaty (WCT) ordering contracting states to take measures against the circumvention of “effective technological
measures” that restrict unauthorized acts in relation to protected works and against unauthorized removal of
“electronic rights management information”. See Articles 11 and 12 WCT. These prohibitions on circumvention are
not absolute. In the American context, see Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 61 (2002) (the DMCA contains institutional safeguards that allow Courts to interpret the legislation so
as to prevent overreaching). In the European Union Article 6(4) of the Information Society Directive mandates that
the fair uses listed in the Directive (Article 5(2) a, 52(c)-(e), 5(3) (a)-(b) and 5(3)(e) should remain intact so that the
beneficiary of the defense retains access to the material protected by automated rights management devices. The
problem with such a detailed rule is that it provides no protection to defenses that are not mentioned in Article 6(4).
See Guy Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe 371 (2002).
28

In ProCD it was first held in the United States that shrinkwrap licenses, which allegedly contract for restrictions
on the “re-use” of copyrighted information, are enforceable. See ProCD, 86 F. 3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a
comprehensive review of the debate surrounding ProCD and the larger issues at stake in shrinkwrap contracts, see
Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998).
According to Madison, ProCD goes beyond the enablement of “intellectual property owners to use contract norms
to create private property rights that exceed the public rights provided by the Copyright act”, it also “shap[es] our
conventional understandings regarding copyright and information rights.” Id. at 1030-31. For literature favorable to
property and freedom of contract in the digital context, see, e.g. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact
of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Charles Clark,
The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE KNOWRIGHT '95 CONFERENCE (Klaus Brunnstein & Peter Paul Sint, eds., 1995); Hardy I. Trotter, Property
(and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1997); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Robert P.
Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A MarketBased Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); William W.
Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998) (arguing for an enabling
treatment that is sensitive to the public interest). For a critique, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998) (the current approach of
private contracting reflects an outdated, overly narrow view of economic regulation by government); Dennis S.
Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997) (with its
uniformity such licenses are equivalent to private legislation); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of
Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1089 (1998) (validates electronic private ordering but holds that Article 2B
U.C.C. “shifts the burden of initiating litigation to the licensee, who in many cases will be poorly equipped to bear
it” and should be invalidated via principles of preemption and freedom of speech). For a critique on the latter, see
David. E. Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: A Comment on “Julie Cohen’s Copyright and the
Jurisprudence of Self-Help”, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1152 (1998) (freedom of contract and the technologies of
digital monitoring and self-enforcement allow producers to better create legally adequate contracts in a mass market
context.).
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initiatives29 and automated rights management30 further illustrates the expansion of copyright
law into the digital realm.31
2. Patent Law: Inventors as Entrepreneurs
The evolution of patent law is characterized by a similar shift towards increased
“propertization”. The range of the patent system has expanded exponentially over the past fifty
years.32 Patents are being issued for subject matter previously considered beyond the confines of
patentability. Software patents,33 genetic information,34 and the protection of business methods
are apposite examples.35 At the same time, new forms of patent rights are being developed, such

29

See, infra, Section 2.4.

30

See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights without Laws?, 73 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1155 (1998). The
author argues that on-line technology allows copyright holders to create new exclusive rights in information goods.
According to Elkin-Koren, this process of eroding the public domain should be subject to scrutiny because many of
the presumptions in favor of private ordering, the assumptions of economic efficiency and political legitimacy, are
misguided. For a similar scepticism towards unrestricted private control of Internet content, see Lawrence Lessig,
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)(increased private control
endangers the innovation commons of cyberspace); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) [hereinafter VAIDHYANATHAN]
(copyright stifles creativity, policy concerns trump any property rights-based claims). But see James B. Speta, Book
Review: A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat the Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons in a
Connected World by Lawrence Lessig, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553 (2001) (benefits of coordination by enhanced
private control might lead to an overall increase of social wealth); Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999) (self-help systems, even with regard to non-copyrighted material, will empower
technology and contract and, with the emergence of efficient standards, promote the wide availability of content,
while reducing transaction and search costs); Michael A. Einhorn, Digital Rights Management, Licensing and
Privacy, WORKING PAPER (2002) (available at <<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=332720>>)
(with its flexibility and sophistication, allowing the licensing market to evolve is preferable to comprehensive
approaches to a dynamic framework such as the Internet).
31

This issue will be treated in detail below, in __.

32

For an illustration of trends in patent law litigation at the end of the century, revealing the increased scope of the
patent system, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Recent Developments in Patent Law, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103
(1997). Member States of the European Union have rationalized their patent application system in the Patent CoOperation Treaty (PCT Treaty, amended in 1979, modified in 1984). Within the contracting States the degree of
protection and enforcement of European patents varies. Courts look at its national patent jurisprudence, decisions of
the European Patent Office, and case law in other contracting states. Germany is considered to allow for the broadest
claims. See R. Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Disputes, 12 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 497
(1995).
33

On the statutory treatment of software patents in the United States, see DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW 754-764, 864-893 (2002). For a critique of software patents and their limited effect on innovation, see
Lawrence Lessig, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
34

See also below, Section ____.

35

State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (business methods are patentable subject matter under U.S.C.); Larry A. DiMatteo, The “New” Problem of
Business Method Patents: The Convergence of National Patent Laws and International Internet Transactions, 28
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2002) (describing the convergence toward the recognition of business methods
as patentable subject-matter in Japan, Europe and the United States). See, infra, Section ___.
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as second-tier patent protection systems.36 Exclusionary rights have expanded beyond
enablement37 and literal infringements to include equivalents.38 Statutory acts have bolstered
opportunities for inventors to obtain patent rights, even for government or state sponsored
research.39 Innovation has been further moved into the domain of the patents system with the
creation of a specialized patent court,40 and the consideration of commercial success as one
36

For an overview, see Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151 (1999). In general,
“second tier” patents(also referred to as “the utility model” or “petty patents”, receive more limited protection(for
instance, shorter period of protection) than regular patents but are not subjected to prior patentability examinations.
In the context of the anticommons model, second tier patent protection is likely to produce a large number of stake
holders, with high information and transaction costs involving the verification of infringements. This is due to the
high level of post-issuance uncertainty, see Id. p.151. On second tier patent protection see also, e.g., Ann Bartow,
Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and BetterTasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2000) (proposing “a modified form of
patent protection, which may better accommodate patents that are filed for reasons other than obtaining monopoly
protection of an invention for commercial exploitation purposes, such as patents obtained for leveraging competitors
and patents used for keeping up appearances.”, at p.5). Mark Lemley suggests that the high amount of patents
issued, relative to the minimal inspection of substantive requirements represents a degree of “rational ignorance” on
the part of the patent system. See Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1495
(2001). In light of the thesis developed below, infra __, the overall social welfare effect of such patent system
depends on the relative costs of pre-issuing inspection of non-active patents, relative to the deadweight losses
involved in the post issuance licensing process. For a similar proposal with regard to copyright law, see Jane C.
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1865, 1873-93 (1990) (proposing to vary protection across creative “high authorship” works and sweat of the
brow/”low authorship” works).
37

Merges and Nelson note that “because a patent examiner must be able to point at elements in prior art that, a
heavy burden of “disproving” enablement is placed upon the small shoulders of the PTO [patent office]. This in
effect, stretches the enablement doctrine to claims that may be beyond the original intention of the enablement
doctrine: that of limiting protection of those inventions that are specified such that one skilled in the relevant art is in
a position to use all the embodiments of the claimed invention.” Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848-49 (1990).
38

Under the doctrine of equivalents, two inventions are considered identical if they accomplish the same result even
though they may differ in other artificial ways (e.g. name, form and shape). As to its origin, “the doctrine of
equivalents developed because of the frequency of cases where, even though the accused product or process does
not literally infringe a claim, it may be considered essentially the same device as was patented”. Id., at p. 853. For
an illustration of expansionary propensities of the doctrine of equivalents see Hilton Davis Chemical Company v.
the Warner-Jenkinson Company, 114 F.3d 1161 (a product infringes on a patent if it is “unsubstantially” different
from what the patent describes). The uncertainty of such a rule of “unsubstantial difference” increases the risk of
infringement and will lead to more licensing. See remarks by Robert Merges in Teresa Riordan, Substantial
Questions Linger after a Ruling that could give Patent Holders More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995.
39

See, e.g., the Bayh-Dole Act which grants universities the right to obtain patent ownership on federally sponsored
research. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 200-212
(1994).
40

The U.S. Federal Circuit Court has been associated with many of the extensions of patent law. See, e.g., Robert P.
Merges, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2190
(2000) [hereinafter Merges, Solitude], 2224-2232 (ascribing to the Federal Circuit the expansion of nonobviousness in the context of biotechnology and the acceptance business patents and the development of patent
doctrine in software); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 19821994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995) (noting more than average findings in favor of patent owners before the Federal
Circuit); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994) (noting
higher findings of patent validity by the Federal Circuit), see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal
Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validty Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 745 (2000). In the same vain of thought, see
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determinant of patentability.41
3. Trademark Law: Ownership in Words and Signs
Similarly, trademark law has evolved from a concept of tort law, protecting against deceit, to
a more rigorous type of protection that is best explained through the analytical lense of property
rights.42 The “propertization” of trademark law has developed from the minimal protection
afforded against fraudulent intent to a broader concern for potential customers, and for the rights
of control by users.43
With the adaptation of the dilution doctrine, trademark owners no longer need to
demonstrate consumer confusion44 or actual injury to obtain compensation from trademark
infringers.45 The trademark dilution doctrine has been extended to non-competing, but also to
non-identical marks. Trademark law now protects famous trade dress and product configurations,
and provides a cause of action also against consumers who do not use marks properly.46
Similarly, the adaptation of the doctrine of reverse confusion,47 and the introduction of product
Kevin Rhodes, Comment: The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on
Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051 (1991). The question remains whether these expansions of
patent law would have occurred without a specialized court. Specialized courts tend to strengthen the reach of their
subject-matter.
41

For a review of the Federal Circuit’s development of this doctrine, see Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success
and Patent Standards: Economics Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1988).
42

“Courts protect trademark owners against uses that would not have been infringements even a few years ago and
protect as trademarks things that would not have received such protection in the past. And they are well on their way
to divorcing trademarks entirely from the goods they are supposed to represent.” Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Langham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).

43

On the remarkable history and evolution of trademark law, see Daniel D. Domenico, Note: Mark Madness: How
Brent Musburger and the Mircale Bra May Have Led To A More Equitable and Efficient Understanding of the
Reverse Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 597, 600 (2000). In the United States property
rights discourse is most (in)famously applied in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1979); Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
44

The dilution doctrine was uniformly introduced in the United States by the Federal Dilution Statute, in 1995, see
15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (1994).Section 43(3) of the Langham Act grants protection to “famous” marks against dilution,
regardless of “(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception.”
45

These aspects of the Federal Dilution Statute were recently narrowed by the Supreme Court. See The Victor
Moseley and Cathy Moseley, dba Victor's Little Secret, Petitioners v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., et al., Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit, No.01 1015. Argued November 12,2002 Decided March
4,2003; Docketed: Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit January 11, 2002 (00-5320). See
Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court Curbs Trademarks’ Reach, N.Y. Times, March 5, 2003. According to the Court
recognition of a word or phrase as trademark will not necessarily “reduce the capacity of the famous mark to
identify the goods of its owner.” This decision is likely to have a big impact on pending and future cases. See, e.g.,
Linda, Greenhouse, Retail Giant Asks Court to Protect Its Name, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2002.

46

Mark Lemley, The Modern Langham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698-99 (1999).

47

Under the doctrine of reverse confusion, smaller senior users are protected from larger, junior users. Traditional
trademark law protects large, established trademarks from smaller, junior users. The doctrine originates from Big O
Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 561 F. 2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977). For a comprehensive treatment of
the doctrine of reverse confusion, see THOMAS, J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
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design protection48 are important signposts of the expansion of trademark law. Much of this
expansion reflects a tendency to regard trademarks as property or commodities,49 often leading to
the recognition of a broad “merchandising right” in marks.
B. The Backlash Against Intellectual Property Rights
The expansion of the intellectual property regime has not escaped scrutiny. Commentators
are in agreement that the persistent expansion of intellectual property tips the balance towards an
all-inclusive enclosure of information goods. Critics of this trend have raised the concern that the
expansion of intellectual property rights implicates society in ways that go beyond providing
incentives for creation and invention.50
As one esteemed commentator notes: “...balance in intellectual property seems over for now.
A feeding frenzy has taken its place - not just in the field of patents, but in intellectual property
law generally...”51 A review of the literature reveals that an overwhelming majority of
commentators and scholars are disconcerted with the expansive trend of intellectual property
law.52
Much of the criticism surrounding the expansion of intellectual property law has been
triggered by the recent legislative protection of previously unregulated material on the Internet.
There are three main strands of criticism on the expansion of intellectual property law. First, it is
COMPETITION (4th ed., 1999), For a rejection of broad property rights analysis, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
48

This evolution in U.S. case law is traced in Margharet Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations
and the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471 (1998); Graeme B. Dinwood,
Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471 (1997). On
design law in the European context, see UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE (2000).
49

See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519 (1993) (finding
that the introduction of the doctrine of trademark incontestability amounts to an unprecedented recognition of a
property right in trademarks (15 U.S.C. 1115(b)).
50

Many prominent scholarly commentators have expressed concern with the expanding development of intellectual
property law, see, e.g., Mark Lemley, Book Review, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 875 (1997): “I agree both with Boyle’s general point that authors get too much protection from modern
intellectual property law and with many of his specific concerns about the contours of that law.” (book review of
Boyle, Shamans).
51

Lawrence Lessig, The Problem With Patents, THE STANDARD, April 23, 1999; available at <<http://www.
thestandard.com/article/display/ 0,1151,4296,00.html>> (last visited, Sept. 25, 2002). In the context of trademark
law, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123 (1996) (referring to the
“privatization” of words and symbols); Mark Lemley, The Modern Langham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Death of Common Sense] (many recent developments cannot be
explained by reference to economic theory).
52

See, e.g., Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World,
79 OR. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000) (“I argue...that the tendency of Congress, the Courts and, recently, the Clinton
Administration to favor a neoclassical rationale results in an unauthorized transfer of information policy from the
public realm to the private realm”.) Forty-eight law professors gathered forces to submit a brief in support of the
challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Internet Archive in support of Eldred’s
petition for certiorari in Eldred v. Ashcroft (February, 2002) (available online at <<http://www.
law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ pubs/lemley/>> (Last visited December 1st, 2002)).
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generally held that the recent expansion violates the purpose of advances the progress of arts and
sciences because the protection of producers far outweighs what is necessary to achieve the
protection of incentives of authors.53 Second there is the argument, most prominently advanced
by Lawrence Lessig,54 that the free availability of resources, unrestricted by private control
rights, is the main impetus behind technological innovation and intellectual and artistic
creativity. This “innovation commons” was essential, for instance, to the development of
cyberspace. The argument proceeds that, especially in a high tech world, public property has a
greater role to play in encouraging innovation and improvement. According to this view, the
open source movement provides a striking historical example of the viability of a communitarian
perspective on innovation, where profit and monopoly rights are not the cause of innovation.55
Thirdly, there is a belief that the expansion of copyright law has transgressed beyond protection
against unauthorized copying to include the control of the content itself. According to
Vaidhyanathan, the evolution of copyright law has blurred the distinction between the protection
of ideas and expression.56 In this view, copyright no longer protects the creative process, it
merely protects producers while taxing consumers.57 The expansion of copyright law protects the
53

___Add references___

54

Suggesting a public interest explanation, see Lawrence Lessig: “Washington is obsessed with intellectual-property
rights. It lives under the mistaken idea that stronger IP always means a stronger economy. No doubt it means larger
campaign contributions, but whether it means a better market is a tougher question.” Lawrence Lessig, supra note
___.

55

The paradigm example of the open source movement is GNU/Linux, the successful operating system that is
distributed free and is steadily improved and debugged by a network of programmers. Other notable free software
includes Perl m the Apache web server, and Sendmail. See Sonia K. Katyal, Book Review, Ending the Revolution:
the Future of Ideas. The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World and Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of
Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1471 (2002):“if the digital revolution
has taught us anything so far, it is that profit- and copyright - is no longer essential for creativity to flourish, or even
to begin.” Id. 1486. Maureen Ryan, supra note___, at p. 648: “government is required to begin from a public trust
baseline because information is a public trust resource subject to public trust principles.” But open-source
developments do not exist within an economic vacuum. Often pioneering codes end up as commercialized products,
leaving their pioneering creators as folk-hero billionaires (see Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina for their work on
Mosaic, or the sale of Netscape by Treuhaft and co. to America Online). Even the most successful open source
technologies have a business side to them. Companies in the open-source economy make money mainly by tailoring
programs for customers, and with service and support. In this business model, software, would increasingly become
a service business compared with the traditional model of shipping manufactured software goods. See Steve Lohr,
Can “Open Source” Bridge the Software Gap?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2000 (quoting Irving Wladawsky-Berger, an
I.B.M. executive and a member of the presidential Advisory Committee on Information Technology: “I am
increasingly coming to the conclusion that the Internet and open-source initiatives are the free marketplace way of
dealing with the extremely complex software issues we are facing...”). For a comprehensive treatment of the socioeconomic aspects of open source technology, see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and “The Nature of
the Firm”, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
56

See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note__. Also, if copyright rests in originality, this would require dissection of the
creative process of every individual , prior to awarding copyright protection, see Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1023 (1990).
57

In negating the incentive effect of property rights, Vaidhyanathan draws a distinction between “property talk” and
“policy talk”. The former benefits authors, while the latter is attentive to the welfare of society as a whole.
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note__, 12. For an concise overview of Vaidhyanathan principal viewpoints, see Paul
Schmeizer, The Anarchist in the Library: Discussing Cultural Democracy with Siva Vaidhyanathan, BLOGSPOT, 21
April 2003.
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status quo of existing works, to the detriment of the public interest. Stronger intellectual property
rights increase the power of holders of those rights versus prospective creators that rely upon
existing work. These follow-up creators and innovators will need to obtain authorization from
incumbent intellectual property owners.
These accounts suggest that the current trend of “propertization” of information goods58
strains the natural balance between public and private right in creativity, which rests on “a
calculus of net social benefits”.59 This balance between the public and private domain preserves
incentives, while at the same time maintaining a relatively free flow of information to allow
technological progress and unhindered discourse.60
***
This Article does not take such a strong position. The role of private property rights in the
realm of intellectual or information goods has certainly increased. Increasingly, legislative and
judicial decisions have explicitly allocated the various use right in intellectual goods. As the
simplified description above indicates, the overall impression is that this process has resulted in
stronger protection of producers of content.

C. Explaining the Emergence of Intellectual Property Rights
While the term “intellectual property law” is a relatively recent paradigm for the treatment
information goods,61 the dominance of a property right conception of intellectual property rights
58

For the purpose at hand this text will refer to the subject matter of intellectual property law as “information
goods” or “intellectual goods”. The value of these goods is primarily an intangible idea, concept or expression.
59

J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 55 (1997).

60

On the mainstream economic rationale underlying intellectual property rights, see Nikolaus Thumm,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: NATIONAL SYSTEM AND HARMONIZATION IN EUROPE, New York, PhysicaVerlag, 186p, Chapter 3 : Microeconomic Theory of Intellectual Property Rights, 31-43 (2000) (the public good
character of intellectual goods necessitates monopoly rights to ensure innovation and diffusion). On the balance
between incentives and monopoly deadweight losses in patent law, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (on the conflict between patent law
and pre-existing norms of diffusion in biomedical sciences). But see Scott F. Kieff, Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science - A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001) (availability of patent
protection is crucial to biology research; the community norms have always accommodated patents as a necessity).
In copyright law the balance can best be described as a system that “provides meaningful incentives to first authors,
while allowing second authors room to build on their predecessors’ endeavors, as well as reasonable leeway for
autonomous consumer enjoyment...”. Ginsburg, supra note __, at page 65.
61

See Lemley, supra note __, tracing the etymological roots of intellectual property: “The modern use of the term
"intellectual property" as a common descriptor of the field traces to the foundation of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) by the United Nations. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization, done July 14, 1967, art. 2(viii), 21 U.S.T. 1749, 1772, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, 11. Since that time, numerous
groups such as the American Patent Law Association and the ABA Section on Patent, Trademark, and Copyright
Law have changed their names (to the American Intellectual Property Law Association and the ABA Section on
Intellectual Property Law, respectively). There were certainly uses of the term in the literature well before this time,
especially on the Continent. See, e.g., Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 3662)
(defining intellectual property as “the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man's own, and as
much the fruit of his honest industry, as what he cultivates, or the flocks he rears”).
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has developed especially over the past 15 years.62 Where does the property law coloration of
intellectual property originate? Three alternative explanations are prevalent in the academic
debate. In my view, these theories omit essential aspects that underlie the increased activity in
the realm of intellectual property law. This Section proposes that the property rights-focus of
contemporary intellectual property law results from a dialectic process between technological
progress and the value of intellectual property goods. The theory developed in the remainder of
this Section holds that the scope of intellectual property law systems is largely determined by
changes in the value of information goods; and by the transaction costs involved in the
management and enforcement of the rights in these goods. This Section first reviews a number of
theories that attempt to explain the increased role of intellectual property law.
1. Current Explanations
a. The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law
The most straightforward and generally supported explanation for the expansion of
intellectual property rights lies with interest group politics. Small, homogenous groups, such as
copyright owners, are at a comparative advantage in organizing their interests for the capture of
the political and legislative agenda, as opposed to the more heterogeneous, disorganized group of
end users of intellectual goods.63 In this view, factors of political economy are responsible for the
strong property right protection awarded to authors, creators, inventors and brand owners.64
62

Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993);
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 321, 332 & n.44 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 108 (1990); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1997);
Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into
the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1343 (1989) (discussing similarities between copyright law and the common law of property); Boudewijn
Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775 (1990).
63

The pioneering work in public choice theory is James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). The popular sentiment is that the
expansion of intellectual property right are to be attributed to lobbying efforts: “Over the past 50 years, as a result of
heavy lobbying by content industries, copyright has grown to such ludicrous proportions that it now often inhibits
rather than promotes the circulation of ideas, leaving thousands of old movies, records and books languished behind
a legal barrier. Starting form scratch today, no rational, disinterested lawmaker would agree to copyrights that
extend to 70 years after an author’s death, now the norm in the developed world.” The Economist, Copyrights: A
Radical Rethink, THE ECONOMIST, January 23, 2003. See also, the coming together of the CTEA Act, supra
note___.
64

For a description of the economic and political make-up of the intellectual property law system, see Yochai
Benkler, VIACOM-CBS MERGER: From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 569-70 (2000): “One starts with an assumption
that there are producers and consumers and that consumers are better off when producers have high incentives to
produce. One then creates a regulatory system that increases the incentives for commercial production but also
increases the costs of becoming any kind of producer, forcing producers to try to recoup these high entry costs by
selling to wide audiences. This results in a relatively small number of producers able to fund full-time authoring and
pay licensing fees to use existing information, who attempt to recover their investments by capturing wide
audiences. Opposite these producers is a wide, passive audience of consumers constrained to select what they buy
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Yet political economy cannot in itself explain the entire development of intellectual property
law to date; nor can it account for the continued expansion of intellectual property law. If
anything, the political economy of copyright in particular, is more leveled in today’s digital era.
In the current climate, the technology industry has a lobbying agenda that is diametrically
opposed to the interest of copyright owners. The business interests of the technology industry
conflict with that of copyright holders. That is because the appeal of technological devices
increases when these products can be used freely to store and transfer content.65 The popularity
of file sharing, for instance, has created new markets for the computer industry, enhancing the
appeal of their products. The easy sharing of audio files spurred the demand for computer
systems, hard drives, faster microprocessors, new portable digital devices.66 Napster created a
demand for MP3 players and recordable CD drives, blank media CDRs, and so forth. Given the
considerable political power of the electronics industry, one would expect the political balance to
tilt towards lower levels of intellectual property law protection.67
As will be discussed below, new technological advances have increased the stakes for the

from a narrow, relatively homogenous menu of choices intended to guess what a large number of them will select
under these conditions. These producers, in turn, make up the political lobby for continuing the basic structure as it
is. This political economy is responsible for an extensive enclosure movement that has pushed our intellectual
property law toward ever-increasing centralization, and has squelched concerns that this galloping propertization is
attained at the expense both of innovation and of robust democratic discourse that a well-balanced intellectual
property law could serve.” See also, e.g., Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746
(1999); book review of Huber, Peter (1997), Law and Order in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law
Rule the Telecosm, New York, Oxford University Press, 265p.; Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) ; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional
Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, New Institutional Economics]; Robert P. Merges &
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000).
65
Audio equipment is more attractive to consumers if the recording of phonograms to audio tape is permissible.
Similarly, video systems have a stronger appeal if they can be used not merely for playing back movies but also for
recording television broad castings. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America Betamax, 659 F. 2d
963 (9th Cir. 1981) (permitting so-called “time shifting” as fair use).
66
In Amicus Brief No. 01-618, Brief of Amicus Curiae, Intel Corporation in Partial Support of Petitioners, the Intel
corporation carefully hints at this interest: “Consumers rely on the digital technologies created by Intel and other
companies to gain access to and use content in new and compelling ways. At the same time, the continued viability
and expansion of these technologies depend on readily available content that is of potential use and relevance to the
public.” (page 9). This business interest in unrestricted copyright is also reflected in the active advertisement efforts
of manufacturers. See Brad King, Are Ads a Gateway to Illegal CDs?, Wired News, Apr. 11, 2002. Available at
<<http://www.wired.conm/news/mp3/0,1285,51719,00.html>.
67
“Although the content industry has contributed heavily to political candidates over the years and maintained a
strong lobbying presence in Washington for many years, it cannot expect to ride roughshod over the political
interests of the technology industry. Any significant incursions into the freedom to develop new products will
encounter forceful opposition from the technology industry, which, over the last decade, has invested substantial
resources in the legislative process and gained valuable experience in the working halls of Congress. The economic
significance of the technology sector in the United States economy vastly exceeds the contributions of the content
industries and technology companies have strong financial motivation to maintain their freedom to innovate”. Peter
S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, forthcoming in the N.Y. LAW. REV. (2002), 153-54.
Available at <<http://repositories.cdlib. org/boaltwp/5/>>. The consumer electronics industry alone, with annual
revenues of nearly 100 billion U.S. dollars, is several times larger than the music and film industries combined (with
reference to Brad King, Replay TV Won’t Quit, Won’t Quit, WIRED NEWS, June 4, 2002. Available at
<<http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/ 0,1412,52944,0 0.html>>
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public at large, providing them with a stronger interest to organize effectively.68 Several groups
with an interest in opposing broad intellectual property laws have modest political clout.
However, in the aggregate, library associations,69 social freedom groups,70 open software
movements, consumer protection groups, artists’ rights, civil liberties, the digital freedom
movement,71 and the academic community72 may exert considerable pressure on the political
68

The work of Lawrence Lessig in particular rests upon the notion that cyberspace is a “fundamentally important
changed circumstance” in the traditional copyright equation. Because cyberspace makes the public domain so
readily accessible, the stakes are raised to keep copyrighted material flowing into the public domain. Lessig raised
this argument most recently before the Supreme Court in Eric Eldred, et al. v. John D. Ashcroft: No.01-618. See,
Linda, Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments On Extension Of Copyrights, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002.
69
The American Library Association has been especially active in challenging regulation with regard to
anticircumvention, automated rights management, first sale and database protection. See Association of Colleges
and Research Libraries, Washington Watch - ACRL Legislative Agenda (online at << http://www.
ala.org/acrl/legalis.html#copyrite >>).
70
For an example of such concentrated efforts, see Amy Harmon, Owners Of ReplayTV Recorders File Lawsuit,
N.Y. Times, June 7, 2002: “A civil liberties group asked a federal judge in Los Angeles yesterday to rule that
owners of ReplayTV recorders are not violating copyright law when they use the device to compile a library of
television shows, send a show over the Internet to other Replay owners, or automatically fast-forward through
commercials. In filing the lawsuit on behalf of five Replay owners, the Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that
the interests of consumers are being overlooked in an continuing lawsuit that pits the major TV networks and movie
studios against Sonicblue, the maker of Replay. The media companies said that Sonicblue was contributing to
copyright infringement by allowing consumers to engage in activities like assembling an entire season's episodes of
a given show or skipping through commercials.”
71
See, e.g., The Digital Future Coalition (DFC), compromising educational, scholarly, library, and consumer
groups, as well as consumer electronics, telecommunications, computer and ISP industry organizations, to provide
balance in litigation and policy discussions about copyright’s future. See http://www.dfc.org/dfc1/
Learning_Center/about.html>>, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home Recording Rights Coalition consumer
protection organizations: attempting to ensure broad rights of use with regard to VCR’s, DATs, MP3 players and
other technology involving music and video content, see also the Digital Consumer Organization
(<<http://www.digitalconsumer.org/>> and Boycott-RIAA (see <<http://boycott-riaa.com/>>). This movement is
aptly described in JAMES BOYLE, A POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ENVIRONMENTALISM FOR THE NET?
(1997). Available at <<http://www.noemalab .com/sections/ideas/ideas_articles /pdf/boyle.pdf>> (Protest,
advocacy, litigation, gras roots organization, membership, foundation support and digital networking will bring to
about social change).
72
Under the pretense of “...a professional interest in seeing that intellectual property law develops in ways that best
promote its purposes.” (Brief Amicus Curiae Supporting Victoria Secret in Moseley v. Victoria Secret, Inc. (August
2002); the academic amicus brief has become a regular feature in court proceedings. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae
in support of reversal in Napster, Inc. v. A & M Records, Inc. (available on line at
<<http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman /napster/ Amicus.pdf >>); Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the American
Committee for Interoperable Systems in Support of Appellee in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, before the Seventh
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (March 1996); Brief Amicus Curiae of Internet Archive in support of Eldred’s petition
for certiorari in Eldred v. Ashcroft (February 2002) (available online at <<http://www.law.berkeley. edu/institutes
/bclt/pubs/lemley/>> (Last visited December 1st, 2002) . Mark Lemley, for instance, has submitted seven briefs in
his relatively short (albeit prolific) career to date as a law professor. Some professors have been even more
aggressive in their challenge of the expansion of intellectual property. Professor Lawrence Lessig recently disputed
the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act before the Supreme Court. His argument rests on the
premise that the text of the clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizing Congress “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts” by issuing exclusive copyrights for “limited times.” (Eric Eldred,et al. V. John
D.Ashcroft, v.:No.01-618), does not allow the repeated extensions of the duration of copyright protection. See Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments On Extension Of Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002; see
<<http://eldred.cc/ (official web site)>> (last visited, 22nd of November 2002). In association with the Berkman
Center, Lessig decided to challenge the Sony Bono Copyright Term Expansion Act and actively sought to find
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system with their participation in the agenda-setting process of legislative and judicial
institutions. Follow-up authors, inventors, and satirists who rely on prior copyrighted or patented
material turn to the judicial system to challenge developments that afford broad protection to
intellectual property holders.73 Despite the decision in Eldred, constitutional rights provide a
final safeguard against legislation that caters too strongly to the private interest of intellectual
property right holders.74
b. The Persuasion of Law and Economics of Real Property
Several commentators have linked the broad expansion of intellectual property law to the
infusion of the rhetoric of property rights and the application of the economic theory of real
property to “the very different world of intellectual property”.75 Allegedly, this trend commenced
with a shift in terminology.76 When intellectual property rights are coated in the language of
private property rights, and infringement is described as “theft”, creative and innovative work is
conceived of in terms of property rights.77 Once the validity of property rights is accepted, the
application of common law property rules and underlying rationales follows naturally.78 If
plaintiffs with standing: “The next step was finding a plaintiff, someone suffering harm by the extended copyright
period and the abuse of the Constitution it represented.” Steven Levy, Lawrence Lessig’s Supreme Showdown, 10.10
Wired Magazine (2002) (online at <<http://www. wired.com/wired/archive/10.10/lessig_pr.html>>).
73
This raises the alternative that the expansion is not the entire story of the evolution of copyright. The availability
of institutions to challenge legislative capture ensure that counterclaims to expansion get a chance. For a more
complete account of the evolution of intellectual property law protection, see, infra 5.2.4.
74
Feist is one example where expansion was barred because of perceived constitutional limitations on copyright
claims (Feist Pubs., Inc. V. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991). For a discussion of the constitutional
aspect of the protection of industrious information products that lack originality in Feist, see , Jane C. Ginsburg, No
“Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 338, 367-388 (1992). Other examples are plentiful. The most current, high-profile case is the action against the
Sony Bono Copyright Term Expansion Act. For a discussion of the constitutional issues in Eldred v. Ashcroft
(v.:No.01-618) see Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, and William F. Patry, The
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 651 (2000)
(including appellants reply brief at 655).
75
Lemley, supra note __, 895-96. For an example of the tendency to revert to real property analogies when
discussing intellectual property law issues, see the oral arguments in Eldred. One of the Supreme Court justices
drew the real property analogy because “it’s less challenging to the judicial mind”. Proceedings, Case no. 99-5430.
Reproduced in Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Symposium: The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long
is too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT LJ 651, 713 (2000).
76
Lemley, supra note__, 895-96. On the strategic use of rhetoric in the debate over copyright and technology, see
Ginsburg, supra note__. In the hands of copyright owners and consumers, private copying becomes “piracy” and
unauthorized copying becomes “sharing”, respectively.
77
Here, the expansion is conceived as a more general trend in the law of information which allocates a larger role to
property rights both within and outside intellectual property. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do
Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365,
397-98 (1989). See also Justin Hughes, supra note __.
78
“The right to exclude others from using your ideas is no more a monopoly than is the right to exclude others from
using your barn”. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & POL’Y 108 (1990).
On the personal property analogy stretched onto intellectual property, see also Mark Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993), p. 90 (noting early comparisons of the author's right in literary property to
the rights of first possessors in real property chattels). But see Lemley, supra note __, at note 124. “But property in
the sense in which it is used by the Chicago School has only recently been brought to bear with much force on
intellectual property law.”
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private property rights enhance investments in the context of common (real) property , the public
domain of intellectual goods stands to benefit from the establishment of private property rights.79
Innovation is best promoted through strong property rights, especially when low transaction
costs allow for Coasian bargaining. The case for private property rights and contracts, and
against regulation, becomes more attractive if one assumes the smooth functioning of the market,
a view which is associated with the Chicago School of law and economics.80 In Mark Lemley’s
view the overall effect of the neo-classical economic approach is “a challenge to the very idea of
the public domain as an intrinsic part of intellectual property law.”81
Is it realistic to maintain that the Chicago school of law and economics caused the direction
of legislators and courts towards the expansion of our intellectual property law system? While it
is arguable that the Chicago School economists have influenced the analytical terms of the
debate, the influence of this school of thought should not be overstated. If legal scholarship
exerts such profound influence, the current wave of critical attention to the exponential
expansion of our intellectual property laws should turn the tide towards a weakening of
intellectual property laws.82 Given the criticism of the majority of commentators, may we expect
in the near future a contraction of the law of intellectual property? Most studies attest that the
influence of legal scholarship is modest at best.83 In the social sciences, the nature of the
adversarial academic debate tends to generate an overall picture that is noisy,84 a debate that
generally involves an intrinsic amount of indeterminacy.85 In fact, several distinguished scholars
79

This fits within the Constitutional role allocated to Congress with regard to intellectual property rights to grant
authors and inventors exclusive rights over their works in order “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 311-13 (1996)
(linking the rise of property right in intellectual goods to the neo-classical economic theory applied by Chicago
School scholars in law and economics and economics); Maureen, Ryan, supra note__, 657 (“neoclassical economic
theory views a system of clearly defined property rights as a prerequisite for such market efficiency because the
economic model through which the allocative goals of copyright doctrine are theoretically realized requires broad,
fully exchangeable property rights”; Mark, Lemley supra note __, 901-902 (with reference to Netanel, at note 121).
The view under criticism is perhaps most explicitly worded by Judge Easterbrook. See Frank Easterbrook, supra
note __.
81
Lemley, supra __, 902. (if premised on the absence of transaction costs and the prevalence of efficient licensing,
this “wholesale attack” on the public domain is misled).
82
Even Richard Posner is critical of the expansion of intellectual property law: “These rights keep expanding
without any solid information about why they're socially beneficial”, and “At the same time that regulations are
diminishing, intellectual-property rights are blossoming--(two) opposite trends bucking each other.” See, Declan
McCullagh, Left Gets Nod from Right on Copyright Law, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 20, 2002.
83
See, generally, David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1997) (legal
scholarship is involved in an internal discussion among peers); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (legal scholarship is remote from
reality). The influence of pragmatic and economic scholarship on adjudication and legal policy is generally
considered to lie with the development of United States Antitrust law. In general economic scholarship’s effect on
legal decision-making is more contentious, see, e.g., Allen E. Farnsworth, Law Is a Sometime Autonomous
Discipline, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 95 (1997); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary
Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73 (1988). In the patent context see,
Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent
Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 101 (2002) (pragmatic legal scholarship is largely absent from the patent
opinions of the Federal Circuit).
84
On the intrinsic indeterminacy in social sciences, see Jon Elster, A Plea for Mechanisms, in SOCIAL MECHANISMS:
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY (Hedström, Peter and Swedberg, Richard, eds., 1998), pp. 45-73.
85
The academic debate is inherently adversarial. For every academic argument one can find a comment in
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have held that this applies in particular to the economic analysis of intellectual property law.86 As
will be argued below, coating intellectual property issues in terms of property rights is a
superficial change.
c. The Dazzling Romance of Authorship
One school of thought has linked the expansion of intellectual property rights to the
substitution of the “author-as-genius” for the “author-as-craftsman” conception of the 19th
century.87 The general argument posits that authorship today exhibits a flair of romanticism
which is related to the individual’s ability and talent to create intellectual goods from scratch.
Because intellectual authorship is intrinsically exceptional - far beyond “sweat of the brow”
work that characterizes most other productive activities - this romantic conception of authorship,
carries with it a normative command for stronger protection of intellectual work. In other words,
exceptional people deserve privileged protection.88
Do we really own the expansion of our intellectual property system to a romantic conception
of authorship? I believe we do not. For the argument to be upheld, a historical explanation needs
to link an increased romantic conception over time to the expanding reaction of intellectual
property law. It is questionable whether such a continued rise in the romantic conception of
authorship over time has occurred.89 To the contrary, the economic reality of today’s intellectual
contention with it. This is reflected in the exchange of amicus briefs. In Moseley v. Victoria Secret respondents’
amicus brief cites the work of Richard Posner in arguing that dilution differs materially from orthodox confusion
and does not require proof of actual harm. See Brief Amicus Curiae, the International Trademark Association in
support of respondents, pp. 12-14 (available at <<http://www.inta.org/ downloads/brief_vsecret.pdf>>).
86
On the inability of economic theory to provide decisive answers to social welfare issue with regard to intellectual
property law, see George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on
Cheung, in The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19 (1986); Louis Kaplow, The PatentAntitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1833 (1984): “[O]ur knowledge is inadequate to
inspire great confidence even in the desirability of having a patent system at all ...”; cited in Craig Allen Nard,
Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence,
39 HOUSTON L. REV. 101, 123 (at note 73) (2002).
87
For a historical exploration, see Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the “author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
88
James D.A. Boyle, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY, (1996). For more on the concept of romantic ownership, see, e.g. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Ownership, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996) Keith Aoki (199394), Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain , 18 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 1. James D.A.Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
625 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L. J. 455
(1991); Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the Information Age, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2029 (1996); MARK ROSE, THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 125-128 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale
L.J. 1533 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon and Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135
(1998); Symposium Issue, Intellectual Property and the Construction of Authorship, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
227-725 (1992); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE AND THE LAW (1991); James
Boyle, supra note__; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author", 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). But see Jessica
Litman supra note__ (tackling the problematic nature of “authorship” and the subsequent private property rightsapproach to copyright law).
89
There is no direct evidence of a continued rise of the romantic conception of authorship over time. The literature
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property laws, perhaps best exemplified by the rise of corporate copyright ownership and the
transfer of employee inventions to employers,90 conflicts with “author- or inventor-centrism”91
and romantic notions of authorship.92 In another view, the conception of authorship is in itself
troublesome. If we concede to the deconstructionist viewpoint, authorship is suspect since texts
are unstable and originality is inherently problematic.93
***
As will be argued below, the expansion of intellectual property may be explained in a more
straightforward manner. Intellectual property systems simply trace underlying technological and
economic conditions. The expansion of the intellectual property law system has two main causal
determinants: (1) the value of information goods; and (2) transaction costs in the management
and enforcement of the rights in these goods.
2. The Origins of Property Rights in Information Goods
As this Section demonstrates, the rise of private property rights in the development of
intellectual property law is hardly surprising. Private property rights are not the result of simple
legislative capture by content providers, the stickiness of a romantic conception of authorship, or
persuasive scholarship by imperialist economists. Nor is the rise of intellectual property rights
due to any endemic change in the law by itself.94 Private property rights in intellectual property
goods are a simple result of changes in economic values that stem from the development of new
technology and the opening of new markets. This is not a novel claim. It aligns with the seminal
explanation of the emergence of property rights by Harold Demsetz.95 In Demsetz’s words,
“[p]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become
larger that the cost of internalization.”
The connecting factor between Demsetz’s example of establishing property rights in land
and the case of intellectual property law is externalities. Private rights in land and forest animals
among the Montagnes Indians of the Labrador Peninsula developed in response to heightened
does not explain why the appeal of a romantic conception would rise over time. Instead in the era of post-war
industrialization and the emergence of the new information economy, little romantic discourse is to be observed. In
the new information economy it is the CEO/entrepreneur whO is heralded as truly exceptional.
90
Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J. LAW AND TEC. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Merges, Employee Inventions].
91
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 151 (1998).
92
Mark Lemley, Romantic, supra note__.
93
In such a view, the substitution by corporate ownership might have rightly demystified the fallacy of authorship.
Still, its relinquishment to corporate forces has the result of exposing future creative endeavors to the stifling effect
of market forces and monopoly. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note__, 10.
94
Compare Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science,
94 NW. L. REV. 77 (1999) (holding that “not market influence but legal change - specifically the change in
intellectual property rights” is responsible for the introduction of exclusivity in scientific research). Id., 94. This
view is systemic for a belief that granting a property right in an intellectual good makes the pursuit of these
intellectual goods more attractive. Two points must be made here. First, the value of such artificial protection is
limited by the value of what is granted exclusively via intellectual property law. Secondly, legal change does not fall
from the sky. It is driven by underlying social forces. If we are to assume a static economic and norm-based
environment, we will need an alternative explanation to explain legal change.
95
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347-359 (1967).
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opportunities in commercial fur trade, in the same way as property rights in information goods
emerge in the face of new digital markets for content. Because overhunting presents a relatively
serious problem when fur is valuable, there is a strong incentive to internalize costs via property
right protection, especially if the costs of defining the boundaries of those rights are lowered.96
Similarly, if downloading content material on file-sharing systems, such as Napster, dissipates
incentives for content providers, this leads to sub-optimal investments97 and a reluctance of
content providers to sell their products on digital markets.98
Technological change commentators often fail to consider that, no matter how revolutionary
technological advancements may be, the laws of supply and demand and the theoretical
framework of external effects apply to technological change in the same manner they do to any
other shift in relative costs caused by exogenous changes. That is, even in cyberspace the
emergence of new property rights takes place “in response to the desires of interacting people for
adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.”99 In the context of cyberspace, intellectual property
law allows content providers to internalize the commercial synergy between authored works and
new technological means of distribution and presentation of information.
It is not my intention to provide a normative claim as to the appropriateness of the specific
allocation of property rights, as it has occurred the evolution of intellectual property laws. The
basic point made here is that the basic conditions for the origination of private property rights in
land among American Indians apply to the market for intellectual property rights. The
development of fur trade and the development of a digital market for content holds two aspects
in common: (1) a shift in the underlying economic value of the assets in the domain of
intellectual property (strong property rights having an enabling effect in salvaging this
opportunity), and (2) the decreased costs of defining the boundaries of those goods.
a. Increase in the Value of Intellectual Property
Because “our society is predominantly and increasingly a service society”100 and because
“the service portion is increasingly based on information”101 the value of intellectual goods is
now higher than ever. As the economic focus has shifted from tangible to intangible products and
services, transactions in services and information, intellectual property is now an essential
component of today’s economy.102 The commercial exchange of intangibles is a increasing
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percentage of the economy103 and accounts for a sizeable amount of the GNP of industrialized
nations.104 Intellectual property goods have become a “crucial set of corporate assets in the new
information economy”.105 This trend is present in the markets for copyright, patent and
trademark.
i. Copyright Law and the (Several) Miracle(s) of Reproduction
The music industry underwent sweeping changes in the 1940’s with the introduction of
electronic recording techniques, the development of phonogram records and the breakthrough of
the magnetic tape recorder. These technological advances forever altered the nature of the market
for music.106 For those involved in the production of music these advancements increased the
stakes considerably. Phonogram records, improved recording techniques, magnetic tapes and
tape recorders, and nation-wide markets created a lucrative industry.107
With the most recent advancements in digital technology, the means of producing,
reproducing, and storing text, music, and movies are significantly enhanced.108 Combined with
perfect, costless reproduction capabilities, improved compression software, and increased
bandwidth copyright owners have seen the beginnings of a new electronic or “e-market” for the
distribution and commercialization of content.109
Digital technology has also increased the value of information. Digital technologies “break
through the functional rigidities of print media by providing users with extraction tools that
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enable them to sort and arrange data in ways meaningful to them”.110 Modern technology can
turn incoherent data into meaningful and valuable information.
ii. Patent Law: The Marketing Value of a Patent Portfolio
Structural changes in the innovation industry have increased the monetary value of patents.
Large scale markets and rising living standards have increased the stakes in innovation,
especially in therapeutic products. As research becomes increasingly capital intensive, this brings
about the “industrialization of science”,111 reflected in the “corporatization” of industrial research
and development,112 where inventions become strategic tools in a market in which several
multinationals are engaged in a competitive race of innovation.
It has become increasingly harder to draw a strict line between fundamental and applied
research, because both categories have become of commercial importance due to the increased
dynamics between both types of research.113 Take, for instance, the world of DNA sequencing.114
Previously, commercial value lay in the use of DNA molecules for the production of therapeutic
proteins for sale.115 In today’s research climate information itself has enormous commercial
potential, because it provides a direct base for future discovery.116 Instead of cloning particular
genes, the research and development objective has shifted to the more ambitious task of
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sequencing entire genomes.117 Due to technological advances, information itself retains
important commercial value.118 Thus the subject matter of patent law has changed to enable
speedy integration into marketable output.119
Moreover, intellectual property rights have become valuable assets on capital markets, even
before a finished and marketable product exists. Patent portfolios are important tools in attracting
investment and venture capital - working as a signal of the credibility of a business venture.120
As such, patents have come to serve purposes that are unrelated to anticipated commercial
successes, and serve to exclude competitors from a market. Patents have become powerful
marketing tools, used to enhance the value of the patenting entity, as a signal of the latter’s
creativity and technological proficiency.121
iii. The Three Risings of Trademark Law
The historical development of standardized manufacturing and processing technologies,
centralized distribution techniques, and transportation networks122 have allowed companies to
economize on scale effects by targeting a global consumer economy. In these structural
conditions information plays an increasingly important role. Brand recognition is crucial in
information-flooded markets that offer a plethora of different products and services. Providing
recognizable names, signs, and symbols are crucial instruments in such a competitive
environment.123
In the service and information economy, advertising and brand loyalty have gained
importance. By contrast, in the old, post-industrial economy, transactions mainly concerned
discrete, readily identifiable product units. In dynamic, ephemeral service markets, where the
role of experience characteristics are important, non-price determinants of commodities play a
117
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crucial role. This increases the importance of advertising and product differentiation.124
The introduction of electronic commerce presents a third step in the rise of trademarks as
crucial business assets. Mix today’s mass consumer culture with the worldwide, twenty-four
hour access-ability of on line products and services, and a new market forum with immense
commercial potential is revealed. The importance of brands and recognizable signs is amplified
for the purposes of e-commerce, because cyberspace confronts consumers with limitless amounts
of information. This is due largely to economic factors. The low costs of producing and
communicating information via the Internet creates a situation where “the old points of
concentration - the presses and distribution systems - no longer present the same insurmountable
barriers to entry to becoming a speaker as they do in the mass mediated environment.”125 This
results in the drastic reduction of entry barriers for suppliers of products and services. Once
again, changes in economic conditions have increased the stakes for the internalization of
positive externalities.
b. Diminishing Transaction Costs
With each technological progression the transaction costs of communicating, and
transferring content declines. This cost reduction has occurred with the development of mass
media systems, transport systems, the service economy, satellite systems, and the growth of
modern telecommunication.
More recently, the costs of contracting have further declined because of advances in
information technology. Automated rights management systems, for instance, allow for the
mechanical administration of intellectual property licenses. The online availability of intellectual
property right database systems reduces search costs.
By controlling and monitoring each individual use, product differentiation can be
administered even for purposes that were previously left idle because transaction costs were
prohibitively high. As such, technology has improved the capability of intellectual property
holders to engage in self-help measures of enforcement of the statutory monopoly rights
conferred to them by Congress. Digital encryption technology fences intellectual goods from
non-authorized uses. Software of this kind establishes effective rights of exclusion in digital
content - be it text, pictures, music, or movies - because access to the encrypted content requires
an individualized, non-duplicable digital key. In some instances the developments in digital
technology have tilted the protection of intellectual property rights towards more individualized,
stronger enforcement.126 Automated rights management systems, allow content providers to
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restrict access to a fee-per-use basis127 and to monitor with accuracy the use of the content.128
This technology enables “information providers to enforce standard copyright claims
mechanically, without resort to the threat of litigation.”129 There has been much criticism on the
use of technology for the enforcement of copyrights. Some have argued that this technology
allows intellectual property owners to control their work in ways that are beyond the privileges
afforded by intellectual property law.130 Regardless of this claim, the advent of such effective
means of enforcement, forces us to see intellectual property rights protection in more literal
monitoring costs. Furthermore, as privacy suits are finding their way through courts, Internet Service providers have
been compelled to turn over the names of customers suspected of illegally sharing music online. See Jonathan Krim,
File Sharing Forfeits Right to Privacy: Judge Tells Verizon to Identify Customers, WASHINGTON POST, April 23,
2003, E01.
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charge automatically for access to digital works. For a further description of automated right management systems,
see Bell, supra note__.

128

See in this regard: “In the predigital environment copyright gave owners some rights to profit from their work,
but law and reality made it impossible to track or physically prevent all uses of "owned" cultural products in school
papers or personal conversations. Spielberg could charge for all sorts of ways of viewing Schindler but could not
prevent My Grandmother from being made. This is what made it possible for commercial vendors of cultural
products to coexist with a vibrant public conversation. Now, movies released in encrypted digital format can be
made impervious to this kind of creative recreation, and the recording industry can peek into college dorms to see if
kids are mixing their own tapes.” Benkler, supra note__, 571.
129

Of course, no enforcement mechanism is truly perfect. The circumvention of DVD Content Scrambling systems,
Real Networks’ streaming protection measures, Adobe’s eBook reader, and the security code of the Xbox game
console confirm that whenever technological protection of intellectual property is created, some specialist will
always be able to circumvent this technology. The most embarrassing illustration is the faltering of the Secure
Digital Music Initiative (SDMI). The recording industry was hopeful that it would secure protection for its future
releases with new watermarks technology that places code onto a file that is supposed impossible to remove without
damaging the quality of the sound or image. When the SDMI opened a hacking contest, challenging the public to
break the digital watermarks, Professor Felten and a team of computer experts cracked several of these watermarks.
When Felten wanted to present his findings at a conference the SMDI and RIAA threatened to sue for copyright law
violation. Felten’s free speech lawsuit was dismissed in the Federal Circuit. See John Schwartz, 2 Copyright Cases
Decided in Favor of Entertainment Industry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2001. There is a wisdom in computer science
which holds that the same technology that allows the creation of digital protection can be used to break (“crack”)
that technology. This has traditionally resulted in an “arms race” between content providers and the so-called
underground “hacker” movement. Yet, more complex technological protection requires more complex measures to
override this protection. This applies especially when technological protection is built into the hardware frame of the
technology, in addition to the software components. See for instance, the protection built into DVD and Playstation
2 playback devices. As the user-friendliness of the circumvention tools reduce - in order to play illegal copies of
games a chip needs to be installed into a Playstation 2 - copy protection becomes more effective. This issue is
discussed in Ben Depoorter, The Fight over the Direction of Copyright Law in the Digital Era: Cycles and Echelons
in Copy Protection, CASLE WORKING PAPER #11, 22p (2003).
130

See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
511, 513 (standardized, uniformly enforceable contracts will regulate and diminish copyright user rights) (1997);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note__.(technology raises high fences
that amount to unprecedented copyright control); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public
Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
543, 560 (1992) (software license terms amount to “extra-statutory super-copyright”); Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 4, 1996 (technology gives right holders much stronger protection than the rights held
under the traditional copyright regime.) But see Bell, supra note__, 614-18 (those who rely on methods subject to
preemption have the opportunity to exit from copyright into common law).

29

terms. Digital technology brings the law in practice closer to the law in the books.131 Perhaps
some of the criticism of the use of self-help digital technology by producers of intellectual
property is due to the fact that such enforcement creates a distribution of use of intellectual
property that is quite different than more lenient systems of imperfect enforcement that we have
grown accustomed to.132 Although injunction is the standard remedy, intellectual property law
often relies on liability rules when the enforcement costs of property rule protection are
prohibitive. For instance, it is prohibitively expensive to monitor all individual uses of
photocopiers, blank tapes, CD’s, scanners and other devices that can be used to reproduce
illegitimate copies of copyrighted work. Instead, the use of these devices is subject to a copyright
tax.133 For the same reason, copyright collectives grant blanket licenses instead of negotiating on
each individual use of copyrighted work.134 By contrast, recent advancements in automated
rights management technology, encryption software, and “tethered” technology135 provide
copyright owners with the tools to regulate access and to enjoin unauthorized individual use of
content. Of course, such move from liability to property rule protection is not absolute. In the
absence of these measures of protection, and in the hands “hackers”, the very technology that
enables strong enforcement, reduces the costs of the illegitimate transfer of content. Yet, the
costs of legitimate fencing are lowered by new technology and are distinct from the costs of
131
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preventing illegal activities. I return to this issue in the following Section.
c. Discussion
In summary, the increased protection of copyrights, patents, and trademarks can be
understood as the combined result of the increased value of these products and a decrease of
transaction costs surrounding their marketability and the effective protection of these rights by
their producers. Property rights offer an opportunity to content providers to capture the value of
their creations, securing investments in an information or knowledge-economy.
Some clarification is in order. Property right activity develops because of private incentives
of content providers. Precisely for this reason it does not follow that, the emergence of private
property rights imply that the accommodation of technology and intellectual property law
through property right protection will bring about the most efficient allocation from a societal
perspective. Here my analysis departs from the assumption that emergence of property rights
equals wealth maximization or that the developing intellectual property rights necessarily follow
societies’ “cost-benefit equation”, as the optimistic claim in the Demsetzian reading of property
rights’ evolution would have it.136 Rather, it is suggested that private property right allocations
will emerge in light of the interaction of the changed conditions and the preference of those
parties that have a strong incentive to internalize the changing costs and benefits. Private
property rights are an obvious first-best for those involved in the first stage of legal change. To
content providers private property rights establish maximum control rights over intellectual
resources.137 Consequently, private property rights are a main focal point in the struggle over the
boundaries of free access to intellectual material.
Section IV will next examine the societal implications of the emerging “propertized” market
of intellectual property rights. First, I take a step back and consider the larger social economic
process of the emergence of property rights. The original Demsetzian theory on the emergence of
property rights leaves open the precise mechanism by which a property rights systems eventually
takes shape.138 The remainder of this Section is a first attempt to fill this void in the context of
intellectual property rights.
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3. The Evolutionary Mechanism of Intellectual Property Law
A. Introduction
The previous Section states that property rights are a natural response to enhanced economic
prospects. However, according to Robert Merges, there is “nothing foreordained about the future
of the patent system, or of any other branch of the intellectual property system for that matter.”139
I argue that there actually is a degree of determinacy in the evolution of the laws of intellectual
property. The remainder of this Section proffers an evolutionary understanding of the social
mechanisms underlying the development of intellectual property law.
B. The Social Mechanics of Intellectual Property Law Expansion
In this Section I argue that the evolution of the intellectual property law system can best be
understood as a “B2-type process”: two causal chains are triggered, each of which affect the
independent variable in opposing directions, leaving the net overall effect indeterminate.140 More
specifically, of the two opposing mechanisms, the second mechanism is triggered by the initial
causal chain, leaving it impossible to predict the net effect of the two opposing mechanisms.
Applied to intellectual property law formation, the expansion of protection for intellectual
property holders triggers a counter-reaction that moderates the initial increase of protection.
1. Stage One: Perceiving Unrestricted Uses of New Technology as an Opportunity Cost
Traditionally, the first step in the causal mechanism of intellectual property development is a
demand by producers to strengthen intellectual property rights. The previous Section explained
why property rights make sense in light of technological improvements. However, there is a
specific reason why a demand for the expansion of intellectual property law is the initial
response to technological advancements. With the introduction of new technology, intellectual
property law enters a stage of uncertainty. In this phase of uncertainty the default position will
either entail a general perception that (i) the new technology is encompassed by the present
intellectual property law (the default interpretation is one of analogy or precedent); (ii) the new
technology is sufficiently different that such analogy is not obvious (the default position is
differentiation). When the technology is truly innovative, the legal status of uses of it will be
subject to substantial uncertainty. Even when involving resources that are governed by strict
bright line regulation, the practical situation will be ambiguous as to the exact entitlement of use
rights.
Take the example of copyright law. Peer-to-peer networks, new sharing software, wide
bandwidth Internet access, and novel compression formats (such as mp3 and Divx) allow users
to exchange and manipulate copyrighted content in ways and to degrees that depart from
standard notions of copyright rules of access to copyrighted material. In the minds of (self139
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serving) end users such novel uses are considered sharing and not piracy. Peer-to-peer sharing
activities are very different from the traditional notions of piracy. Among other things, there is an
absence of financial transactions, there are no intermediaries, and the same technology can also
be used to exchange non-copyrighted material.
Generally, the introduction of new technology is followed by a phase of unrestricted
application of this technology to existing copyrighted work. This is partly because the true nature
of the problem only truly materializes in the minds of copyright owners when these novel uses
become widespread and more visible.141 First it must become apparent that free use of novel
exchange mediums entails substantial opportunity costs to producers, i.e. that there are “gains to
be internalized”. For instance, the music industry discovered only that huge profits were to be
made by transferring music in mp3 format over broadband networks, at a stage where such
exchanges had become relatively widespread on the Internet.142 This triggers the initial action by
copyright owners to obtain formal enclosure of those novel uses within their privileges as
copyright holders.143
In this first stage, litigation and lobbying by copyright owners often leads to expansion of
copyright law.144 The Napster litigation led to the application of copyright law to a new medium.
Since Napster sharing legitimately purchased content via peer to peer exchange networks is
deemed illegitimate.145 Previously the “first sale” doctrine protected the right to sell or otherwise
141

Historically, copyright owners have always tolerated minor infringements.
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See also the example of the introduction of compact disc technology: “Even with the introduction and rapid
popularity of digitally-encoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of microcomputers beginning in the early
1980's, the record industry did not appreciate the dramatic changes that would be brought about by the emerging
digital technologies.” Menell, supra note__, at p. 49.
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Take for example, copyright owners’ legal action against the Sony Corporation’s new digital audio tape and
mini-disc technology. These devices enable the production and reproduction of identical copies of authored works
with minimal loss of quality. See Cahn v. Sony Corp., 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990). This exercise
would be repeated with the introduction of DVD players. The Recording Industry Association of America
(“RIAA”), representing more over 500 companies engaged in the creation, manufacturing, and distribution of sound
recordings, leads the way in most of these efforts. This effort is compounded by inherent product uncertainty in
content industries: “One of the reasons that business people in Hollywood are so nervous is that they never really
know what’s going to win or what’s going to lose. They don’t know what their markets and audiences really want;
they don’t know how to adjust things in mid-stream. So there’s constant pressure to make their systems more
efficient”. Siva Vaidhyanathan in Paul Schmeizer, The Anarchist in the Library: Discussing Cultural Democracy
with Siva Vaidhyanathan, BLOGSPOT, 21 April 2003.
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For example, e.g., consider the successful litigation leading to a ban of unauthorized operation of MP3.com’s
“private” storage lockers for purchased songs (see Brad King, RIAA Wins Suit Against MP3.com, April 28, 2000
(available at <<http://www.wired.com/news/business /0,1367,35933,00.html>>); the enjoining of the distribution of
Streambox’s Ripper software, which enabled the recording and storage of streamlined material played on real audio
and video players (see Clare Haney, RealNetworks Wins Injunction Against Streambox, IDG News December 28,
1999; available at <<http://www.idg.net/spc_111319_3893 _1-2081.html>>); RIAA’s legal action against
MP3board.com’s search engine for MP3 files, where the RIAA claimed that it is a violation of copyright laws for a
company to provide hyperlinks to publicly accessible Web sites where users can download files (see Brad King,
RIAA: No Hyperlinking Allowed, WIRED NEWS, Jun. 26, 2000, available at <<http://www.wired.com
/news/politics/0,1283,37227,00.html>>), and the judgment entered in Universal v. Reimerdes (Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)) where which prohibited the dissemination of
DeCSS, the DVD decryption program (affirmed by Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.).
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A preliminary injunction enjoined Napster from “engaging in, or facilitating others in the copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected
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dispose a personal copy that had been lawfully acquired.146 As a result, the same borrowing of a
compact disc from a friend becomes infringement when conducted through a peer-to-peer
network.
From this thesis it follows that most revolutionary jumps in technology are thus followed by
period of non-applicability of intellectual property law and a time of open-access sharing.147
Peer-to-peer technology is exemplary of new technology where the synergy between technology
and information content is a sufficient departure from prior understandings of the applicability of
copyright law. The transfer of copyrighted work on peer-to-peer technology was originally left
unfettered because it departed from the for-profit aspects that dominated the legal concept of
“piracy”. Initially, this brings about a phase of non-applicability of intellectual property law.
However, as the use of the technology gained momentum, the line between unauthorized
copying left unfettered and large-scale for-profit piracy blurred. Because non-profit large scale
copying148 by end users remained sufficiently different, the music and movie industry needed to
demonize the technology and voice existential outcries in order to convince courts to resort to
creative interpretation against the default position of unrestricted use. In doing so music and film
producers have argued that peer-to-peer technology creates systemic infringements that
cumulatively would undermine the underlying industry and the future supply of content.149
The above leads to the following conclusions. First, it is not necessarily the case that an
unregulated environment creates the conditions for innovation; rather, it is the nature of cuttingby either federal, or state law, without express permission of the rights owner.” Napster, Inc. v. A & M Records, 114
F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D.Cal. 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the District Court
Decision. A&M Records, Inc. 239 F. 3, at 1011, 1029. (finding contributory infringement for facilitating direct
infringement of its users, with actual knowledge of the infringing materials on its system, finding against fair use
because of the commercial the damage to the present and future nature of digital download markets. Similar suits are
now underway against other popular file sharing devices that emerged in the wake of Napster. The record industry
and Hollywood studios have joined forces to sue MusicCity, Kazaa and Grokster. See John Borland, Suit Hits
Popular Post-Napster Network, CNET NEWS, Oct. 3, 2001. Available at <<http://news.com.com/ 2100-1023273855.html >>.
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17 U.S.C. 109(a).
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This is the creative pooling that figures prominently in the views of Lawrence Lessig.
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The number of Napster users has been estimated at 64 million. See European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, Common Position No. 48/2000, Recital 38, adopted 28 September 2000. Daily users of the other
main peer-to-peer networks, such as Kazaa and Morpheus, are currently estimated at over 1 million.
149

The RIAA regularly calls attention to its commissioned reports on declining sales. See Reuters, Labels Say Music
Swaps Spur Sales Slum, CNET NEWS, Aug. 26, 2002 (reporting a study indicating a decline of compact disc
shipments if 7 percent in the first six months of 2001 versus 2000) Available at <<http://news. com.com/2100 1023-955397.html>>; Margaret Kane, Is Napster Taking a Toll on CD Sales?, ZDNET NEWS, May 24, 2000 (in
1997-2000 sales of CDs within a five-mile radius of colleges declined 4 percent over the last two years). Available
at <<http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-52 1033.html?legacy=zdnn>>; Brad King, Napster: Music's Friend or Foe?,
WIRED NEWS, Jun. 14, 2000 (college stores located near universities that had banned Napster from being used on
school computers showed an 8 percent drop in sales from 1999 to 2000). Available at
<<http://www.wired.com/news/business /0,1367,36961,00.html>>. Sale revenues from on-line purchases have
increased. Yet, as Emusic.com chairman Robert Kohn acknowledges: “it”s clear that CD sales would have been
higher had file trading applications not been around”; Graeme Waerden, Napster Blamed for Plunge in Singles
Sales, ZDNET NEWS UK, Feb. 26, 2001 (The Recording Industry Association of America figures indicating a drop in
number of CD singles shipped in the US in 2000 fell 39 percent). Available at <<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story
/0,,s2084666,00.html>>.
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edge innovation itself that initially keeps new uses beyond the grab of intellectual property law.
In its early stages ground-breaking technology necessarily finds itself outside the confines of
existing legal doctrine.150 Secondly, given that under conditions of ambiguity users of new
technology act according to a default position of free use and access to copyright content, it is to
be expected that copyright owners seek expansion. In doing so, producers set the initial agenda
of litigation151 and legislation152 to establish the application of intellectual property laws to
emerging technological applications.153
2. Second Stage: Loss Aversion
The expansion of intellectual property law triggers a counter movement. In assuring the
urgency of their plight producers of intellectual property often overstate their claims.154 When
these demands result in the extension of intellectual property law, this creates outlier cases that

150

The first phase of non-applicability of standing intellectual property law increases with (i) the novelty of the
technological breakthrough is significant and; (ii) the level of specificity and rule-based nature of the closest related
law. In this regard the more detailed 1976 US copyright Act is less conducive to a status quo in favor of copyright
owners, then the more open ended 1909 Copyright Act.
151

See, for example, the legal battle by the Recording Industry Association of America against the MP3
player/recorder “Rio”. The RIAA accused Rio of violating the requirements for digital audio recording devices
under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, and for not employing a Serial Copyright Management System and
failure to pay royalties on sales of the digital audio recording device, 180 F.3d at 1079. The court dismissed the
claim holding that general computer technology is not included in AHRA. In these cases judges are asked to stretch
the “limits of statutory language” through judicial interpretation and interpolation. Jessica Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 857 (1987) (with reference to U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, BRIEFING PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES, reprinted in Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R.
2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2053 (1975)). According to Litman, courts continued to rely on older precedent
because of the confusion surrounding the 1976 Copyright Act. Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the
parties to the negotiation of 1976 agreed upon language, “while disagreeing what the language meant”. See Id. at
861.
152

Producers regularly address legislators to obtain wholesale legislative amendments to existing laws, or the
creation of new legal rules. See, for example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
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Ginsburg colorfully describes this a “Pavolvian” response to technology that involve new means of making
copies or communicating works. Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note__, 68.
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Some argue that the content industries have a long established tradition of exaggerating their claims. Traditional
print publishers argued that public libraries and photocopiers would undermine the market for books and journals,
and radios would kill the music industry. Later on, video cassette recorders were claimed to be the death of the film
and television industries. Raymond Ku & Ray Shih, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002). See also Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note__.
Ginsburg claims that overreaching occurs by both copyright owners and consumers of copyrighted content and is to
explained by the same independent variable: greed. The author cites reverse engineering and attempts to curb
parodying as two prime examples of over-reaching which put copyright owners in a bad light. Id. At 8. End users
and consumers, on the other hand, overreach when claiming that information “wants to be free” and therefor they
should be allowed to freely share movies across peer-to-peer networks. See also Katyal, supra note__ (the conflation
of both uses of technology leads some to assert the under-inclusiveness of intellectual property rights and others to
err on the side of over-inclusiveness. The same technology that allows peer-to-peer exchange between recreators and
innovators is also the venue where piracy efforts are at a maximum).
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bring about strong images in the mind of the public.155 Consider in this regard, the legal suit by
ASCAP against the American Boy Scouts Movement demanding royalties for campfire
performances of copyrighted songs. This case fueled the fight against strengthened powers of
copyright users and reinforced antitrust awareness with respect to copyright collectives.156 To the
extent that free use develops into a custom (boy scouts performing campfire songs, network
users swapping files on Napster, and so forth), the vigorous legal condemnation of these sharing
norms among users of copyright content will meet strong resistance. Ironically, by expanding
intellectual property law the norms that the legal rules are intended to modify might be
strengthened.157 As another example, imagine the passing of the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention
Act that proposes to provide immunity to activities that disable, block or impair peer-to-peer
networks and private individuals’ home computers.158 In face of such demands by copyright
holders, users respond by applying pressure on the intellectual property system for the reversal or
moderation of those claims.159
155

But see Merges, who finds that, due to their intangible nature, the expansion of intellectual property rights take
place conceptually and, consequently, face no “natural facts to act as a brake on expansive notions of how broad a
right might be, how many people and activities it might reach, or how long it might last...” Merges, Solitude, supra
note__, 2239. In concreto, this might make it difficult to “turn back a judicially initiated extension of rights”. Yet,
conceptual expansion translates into real world consequences.
156

Other recurring examples are the attempts to outlaw technology that accommodates infringement, although the
technology accommodates legitimate uses. Examples of such dual use technologies include time shifting in the case
of home taping, exchange of non copyrighted work or among copyright owners such as young artists in the case of
file sharing technology. See also the proposal to enforce copyright through the control of the architecture of digital
technology, as found in Senator Ernest Hollings proposed Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
Act, S. 2048. 107th Cong., 2d Sess. In this proposal the FFC and Copyright Office would establish security system
standards encoding all rules for all digital media devices sold or offered for sale in the United States. Available at
<<http://www.politechbot.com/docs /cbdtpa/ho llings.s2048.032102.html>>. According to Ginsburg, the many
extensions of intellectual property law that cause public indignation are the result of simple greed on the part of
intellectual property holders. See Ginsburg, supra note__, Bad Name. Dual use technology was explicitly protected
in Sony Betamax where the Court recognized the doctrine of “substantial noninfringing use” to protect providers of
products that can be used for both legal and illegal purposes. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America
Betamax, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
157

There is a growing acceptance of unauthorized distribution of music and films by millions of high school and
college students - this produces a generation of citizens who question the legitimacy of copyright protection on the
internet. See John Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young Internet Users from a Life of Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001.
Law makers should apply “gentle nudges” rather than “hard shoves” to enforce a law that attacks a widespread
social norm. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHIC. L.
REV. 607 (2000) (examining the robustness of social norms). This might apply in particular to the norms and
customs of the sharing of copyrighted material, as developed on cyberspace over peer-to-peer networks.
158

Rep. Howard L. Berman’s Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act would exempt from liability destructive acts of
counter-circumvention where damage to computers is limited to $250 dollars. Available at
<<http://www.house.gov/berman/pr072502.htm>>. The Act does not specify whether the planting of viruses,
worms, denial-of-service attacks, or domain name hijacking, would be permissible. Although the Act states that
“copyright-hackers” should not delete files, the right to sue of anyone subject to an intrusion, during which files are
accidentally erased, is limited. See Could Hollywood Hack Your PC?, Declan McCullagh CNET News, July 23,
2002. Available at <<http://news.com.com/2100- 1023-945923.html?tag=fd_lede>>.
159

A broad range of interest groups provides opposing pressure. This includes e.g. the open software movement,
consumer protection groups, artists’ rights, civil liberties, and the digital freedom movement. See, e.g., The Digital
Future Coalition (DFC), compromising educational, scholarly, library, and consumer groups, as well as consumer
electronics, telecommunications, computer and ISP industry organizations, to provide balance in litigation and
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The overall evolution of intellectual property law thus represents a cyclical160 back and forth
between initiatives on both sides of the private property and free use coin of intellectual
property.161 The evolution of technology is inherently uncertain. Content producers fear that
technology will allow systemic infringements that cumulatively undermine their future.162
Consumers believe that this very technology will allow the content industry to go beyond
intellectual property laws and tighten stronger monopolistic control.163
***
The question remains whether this process will necessarily generate a satisfactory equilibrium.164
policy discussions about copyright’s future. See http://www.dfc.org/dfc1/ Learning_Center/about.html>>, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home Recording Rights Coalition consumer protection organizations: attempting to
ensure broad rights of use with regard to VCR’s, DATs, MP3 players and other technology involving music and
video content, see also the Digital Consumer Organization (<<http://www.digitalconsumer.org/>> and BoycottRIAA (see <<http://boycott-riaa.com/>>: “Boycott-RIAA was founded because we love music. More and more the
RIAA and the major labels have attempted to lock up our culture and heritage through extensive lobbying,
outrageous campaign donations, misleading our political leaders, and lying to the public, while misrepresenting the
facts. Changing copyright law is not a solution for poor management. Copy protected CDs lock up the music
forever, even when the work in question returns to the public domain. This was not part of the copyright bargain our
forefathers struck, nor was it ever intended to provide income for the heirs of the copyright holder. It is our intention
to make the public, and our leaders aware of the implications and long term consequences to our culture of bowing
to every demand the recording industry presents to our congress. It is our intent to continue to unspin the spin and to
represent the consumer and independent artists positions on the battlefield that copyright has become.”)
160

Such cyclical shifts also apply with regard to code. Code originates in an environment of free and open-source
use. As the value of a code increases, the code eventually is subjected to rights of exclusivity. See Lawrence Lessig,
The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 547 (1999).
161

To the extent that this counter movement is successful, we may retain some optimism towards the capacity of the
intellectual property system in accommodating conflicting interests of users and producers of intellectual property.
Compare Menell, supra note__, citing William Eskridge, Politics without Romance, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988)
(predicting that such conflicting demand patters lead to regulatory resolutions).
162

“The problem is that the companies that invest in so many millions of dollars in these high-end commercial
products – the sort of products the US Government decided represented culture – stopped believing in copyright.
They stopped believing you could regulate culture softly and reasonably, because they were afraid that digital
technology would encourage us to undermine the market for those legitimate goods”. Siva Vaidhyanathan in Paul
Schmeizer, The Anarchist in the Library: Discussing Cultural Democracy with Siva Vaidhyanathan, BLOGSPOT, 21
April 2003.
163

On legislation that proposes to install restrictive security chips in all hardware: "[they] are basically legalizing
tactics that are, for all intents and purposes, illegal for all other groups to do... .The media companies are launching a
full-tilt assault on taking away fair-use rights from consumers. The reason they are doing that (is because) they are
after far greater amounts of control over how consumers use media." Joe Kraus, co-founder of the fair-use rights
group DigitalConsumer.org. Brad King, Bracing for the Digital Crackdown, WIRED NEWS, August 22, 2002.
Available at <<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,54681,00.html>>.
164

For a relatively optimistic account, see Menell, supra note__, at p.6. The twenty-year extension of copyright
protection puts “pressure on the system to offset the gains in years with a diminution in the scope of protection, for
example, through a more vigorously implemented fair use exception, not only during the last 20 years, but perhaps
during the copyright term” (footnote omitted). See also the work of Robert Merges, e.g., Merges, New Institutional
Economics, supra note__ (efficient institutions will emerge); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV.1293 (1996) (same) and
Merges, Solitude, supra note__, 2187 (propensity of the common law to adopt to societal change). In some way the
type B2 process explanation peaks into the black box description of intellectual property law formation as “cyclical
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With regard to resource allocation efficiency, the outcome will depend on institutional factors.
Will participation of both opposing groups be equal before both courts and legislators? Are both
institutions equally geared to consider the claims of the parties in the intellectual property law
debate? Or, alternatively, will market interaction abridge some of the interests through the
development of norms, or other institutions? With smooth, independent working legal
institutions, intellectual property law entitlements could arrive at the efficient equilibrium. Given
uncertainty and transaction costs, some have argued that courts are best equipped to solve the
problems of the adaptation of intellectual property law to technological evolution.165 This
approach would suggest the usage of open-ended laws, rather than detailed legislative initiatives
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act the European Union Information Society
Directive.
The issue of the evolutionary adaptability of the intellectual property system does not allow
easy evaluation. Intellectual property systems have certainly expanded over time. In light of the
demands of an increasingly technologically complex society, a certain degree of propertization is
to be expected. But propertization triggers counterclaims, resulting in indeterminate results as to
whether a balance will be obtained. From a resource allocation efficiency perspective, the exact
composition of the property rights assignments, resulting from this process of propertization, will
have differing impacts on social welfare. This Chapter will next explore the role of property
rights, in particular the right of exclusion, in the context of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.

III. PROPERTY FRAGMENTATION: A NEW PARADIGM IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
This Section explores the possible societal ramifications of the proliferation of intellectual
property rights in relation to the economic concept of property fragmentation. Subsection A
demonstrates that extension of property right-protection onto increasingly smaller units of
intellectual goods is problematic, given the “multi-component” or complementary nature of
intellectual property goods. In Sections B to D fragmentation and complementarity (and the
presence of institutional safeguards) are explored with regard to the three main intellectual
property rights.
This next Section first examines in more detail the institutional framework of patent law,
fluctuations between states of under- and overprotection are a characteristic response to borderline subject matters
that fit imperfectly within the classical patent and copyright paradigms” - Reichman & Samuelson, supra note__, 64.
165

Merges adopts a three-tiered theory of the adaptive propensity of intellectual property law, “(1) an early period of
disequilibrium, when new technology may produce widely divergent results; (2) an extended period of adaptation,
when general doctrines developed in earlier areas are applied on a case-by-case basis; and (3) legislative
consolidation, in which a major statutory overhaul codifies some of these doctrinal modifications. The overall effect
of this three-stage process is the slow, steady extension of property rights over the products of new technologies.”
Merges, Solitude, 2190. This is an argument for case for case-by-case evaluations (not unlike a percolation) prior to
consolidation in statutory acts. This implies that systems of judge made law- would be better suited to find a balance
in intellectual property law. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995)
(arguing for a case-by-case formation of the legal foundation of cyberspace). But see Maureen O’Rourke, Rethinking
Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of Law, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1137, 1140 (1997) [hereinafter O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies] (the interaction between intellectual property
law and contract law should be considered “comprehensively and systematically now – before ad hoc judicial
decisions impair the market for licensing intellectual property rights.”).
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copyright law and trademark law166 and relates these institutional parameters to the concept of
fragmentation. In each case I examine the presence of factors that might mitigate wasteful
fragmentation.
A.

The Societal Effect of Propertization and Fragmentation of Intellectual Property Rights
1. Fragmentation of the Public Domain

The expansion intellectual property law fragments the domain of intellectual property goods.
The profusion of intellectual property rights divides the ownership of expressions, innovations
and words in two principal ways.
First, by creating new intellectual property rights on material previously outside the scope of
intellectual property law, new rights of exclusion are established on subject matter that was
previously governed by unrestricted rights of use. For example, new database protection
legislation provides effective exclusion rights to the creators, for “sweat of the brow”
compilations that were previously available for free use.167
Secondly, by enhancing and adding to existing protection, exclusionary rights are added to
the existing bundle of rights associated with those products. For instance, after copyright added
the moral right of alteration to the copyright bundle, a buyer of a copyrighted work is confronted
with an additional restriction on the use of the property rights that remains exclusive to the
copyright holder.
To understand the full complexity introduced with the expansion of intellectual property
law, one must appreciate that a discrete product consists of various inputs, each of which are
subject to individual property rights that are not necessarily held by one individual or
institution.168 The next Section explores this issue in more detail.
2. The Divided Nature of Intellectual Property Goods
The divided nature and complementary propensity of intellectual property has largely been
ignored in the economic analysis of intellectual property rights. However, it is important to note
that there is no “simple ‘one-to-one’ mapping of products and property rights.”169 As Merges
notes:
166

This thesis does not examine the effect and role of trade secrets. Trade secret law does not take ideas or
innovation out of the public domain because trade secret law does not provide owners with protection against
independent discovery. Liability for trade secret infringement occurs only in the context of improper reverse
engineering. Yet, in other ways trade secret is anathema to the norm of science because it is premised on secrecy
rather than disclosure, which altogether forecloses further research by the wider the scientific community. See
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights & Norms, supra note__, 206-207.

167

See European Directive on Database Protection, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (O.J. No L 77 of 27.3.1996, p. 20.) The format,
ordering and presentment of a database are covered by copyright law. See, supra, Section 5.2.1.

168

See Merges, New Institutional Economics, supra note__ , 1862: “small speciality firms appear to be increasing
their share of overall R&D”.

169

Id., 1859 (critiquing the assumption implicit in the neo-classical economic model that “one, and only one,
property right covers the entirety of a marketable product”, while pointing out, more generally, the important role of
institutions in the coordination of intellectual property rights.)
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“A commercially viable product will often be assembled from a number of components. One or more
of these components may be covered by intellectual property rights, but it is not always true that a
complete product will be covered by one, and only one, comprehensive intellectual property right.
Complex, multi-component products are the norm in many industries (e.g., autos and consumer
electronics), and individual patents often cover only a single component or subcomponent. ... multicomponent works are far from uncommon. Indeed, motion pictures, sound recordings, and magazines all
have multiple ‘components’ or inputs.”170

Today’s market for intellectual property is characterized by an increasing degree of
composite creation and innovation. Digital technology and ever growing back catalogues have
allotted a greater creative role to the combination of intellectual property works in the creative
process. Digital production tools enable artists to produce derivative works of art that combine
cut and paste processing of samples, images, and sound effects from other creative works. For
example, in the case of DJ-mix compilations, artists innovate by combining other artists’ tracks
171
in an original version. In a more profound way, the very act of authorship is based on the
works that preceded it. Every author stands on the shoulder of his or her predecessors when
adding an increment to the creative domain. Litman notes:
“Composers recombine sounds that they have heard before; playwrights base their characters on bits
and pieces drawn from real human beings and other playwrights’ characters; novelists draw their plots
from lives and other plots within their experience; software writers use the logic they find in other
software, lawyers translate from old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers, actors, choreographers,
architects and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is
already out there in some other form.”172

In this regard the public domain deserves appreciation as “a device that permits the rest of
the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.”173
Economic theory describes the potential societal costs of excessive property
fragmentation.174 In the presence of complementarities, the use of resources independently
170

Id., 1859.
One of the most highly acclaimed Dj-mix albums, “2 Many DJ’s: As Heard on Radio Soulwax”, combines 46
songs of various artists. Reportedly, the clearance of the rights on the songs, featured on the album, lasted three
years, involving 865 emails, 160 faxes and hundreds of telephone calls. In the end 72 tracks were omitted from the
album
because
the
rights
could
not
be
obtained
in
time
for
those
tracks
(see
<http://breedband.telenet.be/muziek/dossiers/2manydjs/>, last visited, May 12th, 2002>).
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Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990) (footnotes omitted).

173

Id.
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Originally coined by Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1165-1258 (1968), Michael Heller revitalized the concept
of anticommons property. In an article on the transition to market institutions in contemporary Russia, Heller
discusses the intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts. Stores in Moscow are subject to underuse because there are
too many owners (local, regional and federal government agencies, maffia, etc.) holding rights of exclusion. The
definition of the anticommons as employed by Heller, a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective
rights of exclusion in a scarce resource, provides a powerful tool for property theory. See Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 621
(1998). For a recent treatment of the danger of over-fragmentation see e.g. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE LAW REVIEW 1163-1223 (1999) (recognizing a “boundary principle” in property law
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controlled by different individuals leads to underuse and overpricing. 175 The problem of
fragmentation derives from a positive externality due to complementary features of exclusive use
rights. The right to exclude is embedded in the control that each property owner exercises over
the use of the common resource by other agents. Property excluders do not capture the external
effects of their individual decisions. This leads to an excessive level of exclusion, with
underutilization of the joint property as a result. When ex-post opportunities arise which require
exclusive use of various individual property right on a land parcel, these various fragments
become complementary inputs into a more productive unit. Deadweight losses of
underutilization or underinvestment occur when transaction costs create an impediment for an
effective rebundling of complementary inputs.
Of course, according to Coase’s theorem, such initial partitioning of property rights does not
matter for the allocation of resources when all rights are freely transferable and transaction costs
are zero.176 Reaggregation into clusters through voluntary transactions between the individual
owners will maximize total value of the resources. Once the ideal conditions of the positive
Coase theorem are relaxed, over-fragmentation poses an engaging incident of “asymmetric
transaction costs.”177 The presence of such asymmetry is due to the fact that the reunification of
fragmented rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs of a greater magnitude than
those incurred for the original fragmentation of the right. The intuition for such asymmetry is
quite straightforward. A single owner faces no strategic costs when deciding how to partition his
property. Conversely, multiple non-conforming co-owners are faced with a strategic problem,
given the interdependence of their decisions. These strategic costs increase the transaction costs
of any attempted reunification of the fragments into a unified bundle.

***
that purports to prevent excessive fragmentation; and criticising the Supreme Court’s violation of the above
principle by way of protecting increasingly minimal property fragments in a recent number of cases). See also
Michael M. Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE (1998), excerpted as Upstream Patents = Downstream Bottlenecks in 41.3 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES 93-97 (Fall/Winter 1998) (cautioning against the stationary effects of upstream patens on
downstream patent markets); Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 (2) J. OF
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sellers); Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Price Theory of Copyright: The Doctrine of Fair Use, 21 (4)
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 453-473 (2001) (upholding the usefulness – from a strategic
costs perspective – of fair use in copyright law in the digital era); Thomas J. Miceli & and C.F. Sirmans, Partition of
Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard to Do, 29 (2) J. OF LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000) (examining the modern
statutory remedy that allows courts to order forced sale of an undivided land under joint ownership).
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For composite creation and innovation, fragmented exclusion rights are problematic when
we contemplate market failure in the licensing and negotiation of future allocations of use rights.
The problem results from the complementary nature of many individual works of
intellectual property. In the context of copyrightable content this often means that “every author
is also a user of prior works.”178 In effect, the extreme propertization of each of those individual
contributions creates a setting where any subsequent author is at risk of being excluded from all
possible sources of inspiration.
In this context, the real property-analogy, previously associated with the case for the
expansion of intellectual property law, works in the opposite direction: “If every valuable interest
constituted property, then practically any act would result in either a trespass on, or taking of,
someone’s property...”179
The application of strict intellectual property rights to the Internet, the a multitude of
conflicts between overlapping rights might arise. That is because cyberspace consists of a “whole
set of overlapping rights”, whereby “a single act of transmission or browsing on the Net can
potentially violate all of the exclusive rights listed in the Copyright Act...”.180
More generally, while the allocation of property-right entitlements may provide incentive to
truly original work, it threatens to lower creativity involving original combinations of works in
the arts and sciences.181 On a societal level this threatens to undermine the capacity of each
potential user to “partake” in the common cultural and scientific conversation.182
In order to evaluate the problem, the next Section will consider in more detail the level of
exclusionary rights currently present in the property right bundles of patents, copyrighted content
and trademarks.
B.

Patent Law

1. Patent Law and Exclusion Rights
A patent provides an inventor with the exclusive right against all unauthorized uses of the
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Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note__, 885.
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Kenneth Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 329 (1980) (cited in Boyle, Shamans, 48; duplicated in Lemley, Romantic
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patented product.183 Exclusion rights are considerable under patent protection. Other potential
users of the resource are abstained not only from manufacturing, but also from using, selling, or
importing the resource without prior consent from the patent holder.184 A patentee’s exclusive
right extends to identical inventions, regardless whether these inventions were copied from the
patent and irrespective of any good faith intentions on the part of the patent infringer. In addition,
the doctrine of “equivalent patents” extends the control rights of the patentee beyond the terms of
the patent description. Under this doctrine the holder may exclude the development of all
subsequent, similar, non-identical, useful inventions.
The scope of a patent is the crucial determinant of the scope of an individual patent’s
exclusionary right. When a patentee argues that his patent has been infringed he or she needs to
demonstrate that the infringer’s patent or use falls within the boundaries of the claimant’s prior,
protected patent. The initial decision on patent scope is made by the patent claimant.185 This
decision is subject to the scrutiny of the Patent Office, which verifies whether the claimed
invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and
enablement.186 If a patent infringement is litigated, these aspects are re-evaluated by the court.
Because of the strict liability nature of patent infringements, the patentee will in effect
enjoin the unauthorized manufacturing, use, sale, or importation by the infringer.187
As such, the legal protection of the patent system creates the conditions for the exercise of
significant rights of exclusion in inventions.
2. Formal Example
The exclusivity awarded by a patent becomes a crucial factor when a prospective follow-up
inventor needs to rely on prior, patented, inventions for his own research. Consider the following
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formal illustration by Schulz et al..188 When two firms each hold a patent in a technology that
requires the use of both (complementary) patents, any third party desiring use of the technology
will need to obtain access to both patents. Suppose that there is a continuum of such third party
firms where each firm is characterized by its willingness to pay for the use of the two patents,
denoted w. Let w be uniformly distributed across [ 0, 1]. Suppose the patent holding firm i asks a
price pi for a license to use its patent. Hence the price to be paid to both patent holding firms is p1
+ p2. All third party firms with a willingness to pay at least such amount will ask for a license
from both firms. Given the assumption on the distribution of the potential licensees the demand
for patents is 1 – ( p1 + p2.), patent holding firm 1 has a profit of
p1 (1 – ( p1 + p2.))
with an analogous expression for firm 2. The decision to set a price for a license can be
modeled again as a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move game. The equilibrium value of
both prices is 1/3 such that both licenses cost 2/3.
Suppose now that both patents are in the hands of just one firm that demands a price of P for
a license on both patens. Then the profit of this firm will be
P(1–P)
which will be maximized at P = ½. Hence, fragmentation raises the price for both licenses.
This induces some firms not to employ the technology. Therefore fragmentation decreases the
value created by the technology.
3. The Imperfect Patent Licensing Market
As discussed in Chapter II, parties that hold complementary inputs may fail to maximize the
total value of resources because of transaction costs or strategic behavior. In the particular case
of patent licenses there are several factors that further complicate the licensing process between a
patent holder and an improver or follow-up inventor.
a. The Unpredictable Path of Innovation
Research on patentable inventions entails a significant degree of ex-ante uncertainty.189 It is
unduly hard to predict inventions in advance or to estimate the value of inventions with some
degree of success.190 Historical examples of the difficultness of getting to an accurate estimation
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of the expected value of present inventions include IBM’s underestimation of the future market
of home computers.191
Uncertainty as to the value of an invention also extends to a follow up invention. The
usefulness of a patented good in the licensee’s context is subject to another layer of uncertainty
when applied to the context of the licensor’s invention.
These high levels of uncertainty regarding the value of a patent will make a prospective
licensee cautious and reluctant in the negotiation of a licensing price. When both parties’
expectations diverge too widely no licensing agreement may be reached.192 Moreover, as
experimental research has demonstrated, uncertainty has a magnifying effect on reservation
prices.193
Highly detailed contracts might ameliorate the problem but integrating all possible
contingencies into contract is costly and not all eventualities are foreseeable.194
b. Product Complexity
Due to the technical and complex nature of patented products, intellectual property licenses
are highly complex and more costly than regular licenses.195 In the case of technology licenses,
transaction costs amount to 20% of the total value of the underlying license.196 These licensing
contracts regularly include complex assignments of partial legal rights, and long term agreements
that regulate the future and ongoing relationship between the licensee and licensor.
c. Valuation and the Information Paradox
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Licensing agreements encounter specific problems in the valuation of patents. The
uniqueness of every individual invention prevents parties from accurately estimating the “cost of
a license on the value of the right licensed.”197 Moreover, it is hard to place separate values on
relative contributions of the pioneer and improver, in combination with the uncertainty of the
technology prospects of development and profitability.198
The information problem is even more complex in the course of license negotiations
involving potential rather than actual improvers.199 In such a context parties face what is known
as Arrow’s Information Paradox.200 The actual improver possesses valuable information that he
would like to disclose to the patent owner in exchange for money.201 However, the exchange can
not occur before the original owner is in a position to evaluate the information, while at the same
time, under prospect theory,202 this would entail that the patent owner is free to use the patented
information once she finds out what the improvement consists of.203
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d. The Conundrum of Potential Prospect Inventors
For potential improvers licensing is especially difficult when transaction costs (1) are higher
than perceived (but overly pessimistic) evaluations of the value of improvements; or (2) lead
improvers ex-ante to forego improvements in the advent of these transaction costs.204 Both these
options create deadweight losses due to the misperception on either the value of the
improvements or the height of the transaction costs. Both are a subset of the more general
condition of uncertainty.
As such, these observations give pause to pessimism as to the likelihood that follow-up
innovators and improvers, actual and potential, will be successful in obtaining the patent rights to
combine into their own research.205
4. Safeguards and Legal Caps on Dysfunctional Fragmentation of Innovation
The problematic nature of exclusivity of innovation of the patent system depends largely on
the institutional framework of patent law. As Merges notes, “sensitivity to the life of a property
right after it is initially granted – the pattern of transactions in which it is exchanged, and the
institutions that may grow up to facilitate this exchange – reveal much about the optimal nature
of the right.”
There are a number of factors that may mitigate the problem of fragmentation. Whether
these rules and institutions are sufficient to overcome most instances of underuse and
underinvestment is an empirical matter. For the moment, it will be useful to identify rules in
patent law that might ameliorate the anticommons problems.
Most importantly, patent rights are subject to a limited duration.206 After expiration of the
statutory period207 patent technology reverts to the public domain, where it be freely used to
infuse the future innovation.
Under the doctrines of first-sale and exhaustion doctrines a lawful purchaser is permitted to
use and resell patent technology without the patentee’s permission.208 These doctrines apply only
to situations where the patent has been sold.
The doctrine of patent misuse prevents cases where patents are used as leverage for the
purchase of monopoly in different product markets.209
Under the doctrine of “blocking patents” the holder of the narrower (“subservient”) patent
cannot practice the invention without a license from the holder of the dominant patent, while at
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the same time, the holder of the dominant patent can not integrate the improved feature without a
license. Thus, in case where the alleged infringer holds a narrow patent on an improved feature
of the broader, allegedly infringed, patent, patent law places both parties in a bilateral
monopoly.210 The doctrine of “blocking patents” presents each party with both a carrot and a
stick in the negotiations. Yet a blocking patent situation may develop into an anticommons when
a third party wants to obtain two complementary patent that are blocked.211
Under the “reverse doctrine of equivalents” no infringement will be found if the innovation
carries a significant contribution that takes the invention outside of the original, allegedly
infringed patent.212 When there are substantial technological advancements at stake, patent law
thus eliminates the veto rights of complementary right holders (monopoly or bilateral
monopoly). In cases of significant technical achievements the reverse doctrine of equivalents
acts as a merit-based type of fair use and trumps the right to exclude. This will likely encourage
more voluntary licensing in cases where a pioneer and an improver holds exclusive rights into a
complementary unit.213 The doctrine may act as a potential threat of to moderate the expected
value of the pioneer and might thus create a “bargaining overlap” between the pioneer and
improver.214
Similar to a fair use defense, patent law encapsulates a “experimental use” exception for
patented technology.215 This doctrine is, however, restricted to instances where the
experimentation does not further the legitimate business interest of the potential infringer.216
Unlike copyrighted works, patents do not lend themselves well to pooling by intermediaries.
Licensing patents in bulk is extremely difficult because of the more complicated nature of
patents and inventions. Especially improvements are hard to categorize. Assessing fees for
individual uses might be very hard.217 There is historical evidence as to a collective exchange
pooling in the automobile and aircraft industries, albeit only after many years of “significant
litigation and refusal to license” between the main competitors.218 Also, the rapid turnover rate
associated with the software and biotechnology industry prevents the existence of “close-knit”
communities that are conducive to the emergence of such pools.219
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As a last resort, the anticommons bottleneck might be overcome by more direct regulatory
interventions such as compulsory licensing.220 Some have argued that compulsory licensing has
never been successful in the patent context.221 The licensing of patents generally involves
transfers of unique, highly specialized technologies, the valuation of which relies on prior
experience. Non-voluntary licensing may thus give rise to cases of over- or undercompensation
and tilts the balance towards “part-to-party valuation.”222 - a perspective similar to the general
specific performance bias in economic scholarship of contract law.223 Furthermore, some have
argued that transaction costs and bargaining problems do not bar exchanges but instead lead
parties to invest in institutions that lower the costs of exchanges.224 Compulsory licensing
solutions might thus prevent the emergence of these efficiency-enhancing institutions.
B.

Copyright Law

1. Copyright Law and Exclusion Rights
Copyright law protects the expression of ideas.225 An expression must contain a certain
degree of originality and it must result from the author’s efforts. Once these conditions are
fulfilled, the author benefits from copyright protection without any further formal requirements.
Copyright law grants authors five exclusive rights, each subject to certain exceptions: “1)
the right to reproduce in copies or phonorecords; (right of reproduction)226 2) the right to prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted work (the adaptation right);227 3) the right to
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Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note__, 99-102.
223
See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a
Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). But see Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money
Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982).
224
Such is the operating hypothesis of much of the work of Robert Merges. See Merges, Coase, supra note__, 2668.
225
On the similarities and overlap between subject matter and social utility of patents and copyrights, see Lemley,
Economics of Improvement, supra note__,1034-1038.
226
17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
227
See Id., § 106(2).
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redistribute copies or phonocopies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfers of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending (right of re..);228 4) the right to perform the
work in public (right of public performance);229 and 5) the right to display the work in public (the
right of public display).230 Copyright’s exclusionary rights are enforced by temporarily and final
injunction. This is also due to the fact that damages are hard to prove, and under-compensation is
likely.231
2. A Formal Model
Consider the copyright law problem faced by an author in his dealings with a book
publisher. Suppose that the author wants to sell his copyright to the book for price p2 per copy
sold. The publisher expects the demand for the book to be 1 – p1 , where p1 is the price the
publisher charges. Aside from costs, the profit of the publisher is thus
( p1 - p2 ) (1 – p1)
and the profit of the author is
p2 (1 – p1).
If the author commits first to a price - a natural assumption in this context - the pricing
decision can be described by the Nash equilibrium of a two stage game. Equilibrium values are
½ for p2 and ¾ for p1. If the author had the opportunity to market the book himself the price
would be ½. Once again the fragmentation of rights results in a higher price and sub-optimal use
of the intellectual property– in this example a decrease of potential readership.232
3. Safeguards
The exclusionary effect of copyright law is moderated in that it does not protect against
independent development. A copyright holder needs to assert actual reliance on the part of the
alleged copyright infringer.233
228

See Id., § 106(3).
See Id., § 106(4).
230
See Id., § 106(5).
231
2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 11.0 at 24748 (1989): “Courts exercise their
statutory authority to grant temporary injunctive relief more readily in the context of copyright actions than in any
other intellectual property cases (cited in Merges, Coase, supra note__, 2667). See also, PETER A. STONE,
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 91 (1990): “The grant of a final
injunction to a successful copyright plaintiff is almost automatic, since its refusal would amount to judicial
connivance at the compulsory purchase by the defendant, without statutory authority, of the plaintiff’s proprietary
rights.” See also Information Society Directive (Dir. 2001/29/EC, [2001] O.L. 167.) which reinforces the strength of
remedies in the digital context, providing that remedies must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. Article
8(1) Information Society Directive (Dir. 2001/29/EC, [2001] O.L. 167).
232
See Schulz et al., supra note__.
233
2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, 7.2.2., at 7:19 (2d ed. 1996). This stands in contrast to patent law, which does not
discriminate among independent development, and instead treats all use as infringing. Also, patent law does not
contain any use defenses. For an innovative proposal that allays patent law with copyright law in this regard, see
229
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A number of aspects of current copyright law have received criticism. According to Elkin
Korin much of the expansion of copyright is due to the erosion of the idea-expression
dichotomy.234 Allegedly, today’s standard of originality is one of origin, not novelty. A work
receives copyright protection when it has not been copied from another source, and involves a
minimum of creativity.235 But it must be an expression and not an idea, the expression itself is
what is protected then. By blurring this distinction the scope of property rights is considerably
extended.236 By reinforcing a stricter requirement of novelty the reach of copyright law could be
contained.
Some have argued in favor of limiting copyright remedies to liability rule protection.
Lawrence Lessig advances such “compensation without control”,237 for instance via a process of
compulsory licensing, where the government could set “reasonable” royalty rates to compensate
artists while assuring access to the community of users and prospective inventors.238
4. The Emergence of Efficient Institutions: Copyright Pooling
As illustrated above, part of the problem with the anticommons in copyright law results from
the fact that the fragmented group of copyright holders fail to coordinate the pricing of their
licenses.
Collective rights organizations, act as a intermediaries between the right holders (supply)
and individual users (demand). The potential availability of a single avenue to purchase the
complementary rights might, varying with the inclusiveness of the intermediaries right’s
collection, solve the problems documented in the economic model of fragmentation.
Firstly, when authors join copyright collectives they “contract into liability rules”, as they
no longer retain a full veto right on the use of their works, which overcomes the difficulties

O’Rourke, supra note__, 1245. But see for a rationalization of the many differences in the laws of patents and
copyright law, John Shepard Jr. Wiley, Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1991) who
characterizes the observed differences as a “simple matter of volume”: “The nation in its entire history has granted
only 5.27 million patents. It would not be surprising if a country of a quarter of a billion people created that number
of different written documents, photographs, and works of art and music in a single day. Id, at 182 (footnotes
omitted).
234
Under what is called “the law of ideas”, the United States case law has provided individuals the protection of
ideas as mere personal property. These cases typically involve situations where individuals, unaffiliated with
companies, produce ideas and submit them to corporations, who use the ideas without authorization or
compensation. See M. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 259-99 (1992, 2nd ed.) (citing case law which
imposes requirements of novelty and concreteness on the protection of ideas- including Buchwald v. Paramount
Pictures, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1497 (cal. Super Ct. 1990); Murry v. National Broadcasting, 844 U.S. F2d 988 (Second
Cir. 1988).
235
“Copyright shall extend to expressions and not ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts
as such.” See Article 9(2) TRIPS Agreement.
236
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 445 (2001).
237
Katyal, supra note__, 1474.
238
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 241-258
(2001). See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) and O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies, supra note__
(because intellectual property increasingly involves contracts and commercial transactions U.C.C. damage remedies
should, in most cases, take priority over injunction as the default remedy).

51

associated with the commitment and coordination of property right rules. 239
Second, intermediaries hold a certain authority and practical ability to set prices.240
Copyright collectives and other intermediaries often retain the independent power to specify
prices for individual transactions. Copyright intermediaries regularly engage in third degree price
discrimination, charging different prices to various broad categories of licensees (e.g., profit/nonprofit, number of seats in a venue, number of listeners of the radio station, voltage, etc.).241 When
selling copyrighted products that are complementary inputs, the intermediary would choose
prices that are lower than the prices copyright holders would have been chosen if pricing
independently from one another. The salient point is that the lower price charged by the
intermediary is beneficial to all individual copyright sellers, since it allows them to maximize the
total profit from the sale of their licenses, improving upon the alternative anticommons result
reached in the absence of price coordination.242 The paradox – that the intermediaries price is
lower than one that would have been chosen by the owners and yet it increases their total profits
from the sale – can be understood by recalling that the anticommons equilibrium pricing is the
direct outcome of a “prisoner's dilemma” that individual copyright holders face when pricing
239

See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note__
On the license terms and contractual setting of the main performance right organizations in music, the American
Society of Composers Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) see Francesco Parisi
& Ben Depoorter, The Market for Copyrights: The Price Theory of Copyright Collectives, in THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watts, eds., 2003).
241
For further reference, see <<http://www.ascap.com>>, (last visited November 20th, 2001).To be more precise, as
a matter of law, copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI do not have exclusivity in the sale of copyright
licenses. Recent antitrust rulings require copyright owners to retain the ability to issue licenses (“direct licenses”) for
their work. When involving “complements”, owners have no incentive to deviate unilaterally from the coordinated
pricing equilibrium induced by the intermediary. Owners will not be able to sell for more than the “collectives”
equilibrium price and, given the complementarity of the licenses, they have no incentive to sell for less. The
competition between source and intermediary licenses would thus have no effect on the equilibrium price. The
antitrust provisions on this point are therefore ineffective. See Parisi, & Depoorter, supra note__.
242
The question arises whether the analysis applies also to tying practices. ASCAP and other comparable
performance right institutions only offer blanket licenses (covering the right to perform the collective’s entire
repertory) and to a small extent per-program licenses (a blanket license that covering use of the repertory in a
specific radio or television program, while requiring the user to keep track of the use). As a practical matter, perprogram licenses are rendered unattractive by ASCAP and BMI, because of a cumbersome procedure and the
threatened enforcement of non-intentional infringement. Also, it is questionable whether source- and direct licenses
provide alternatives to the preeminent system of blanket licenses in performing rights. The viability of source
licenses is hampered, for syndicates generally tend to split-off performance rights to the collective performing rights
associations; while original copyright holders are reluctant to license their works individually. In fact, the collectives
have objected to anything but blanket licenses and have been ostensibly unwilling – despite efforts by the antitrust
authorities – to item-specific licenses (e.g., right to use a particular song once). The most obvious explanation for
this reluctance lies in transaction costs saving arguments; see Kirby S. Besen & S. Salop, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Collectives, 78 VA L. REV. 383 (1992). The analysis above provides an additional rationale for the
strategy of collectives with regard to blanket-licenses. By tying all licenses together, copyright collectives are able to
shield their market power from the potential competition of individual source licenses. Tying, in other words, is
instrumental to the sustainability of the concentrated monopolistic pricing of the copyright collectives. Bearing in
mind the previous discussion, this has dual effects from an efficiency point of view. In the “complements” case, this
prevents the tragic outcome of the anticommons pricing. However, in the “substitutes” case this has the effect of
preventing desirable competition. The traditional concern of tying should thus be reappraised in light of the
beneficial effects of “packaging” complementary goods, to avoid the undesirable pricing problems discussed above.
At first impression, bundling may be the result of the successful coordination of suppliers of complementary goods,
who have overcome the hold-out strategies that generate the complementary oligopoly problem.
240
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copyrights independently. While individual sellers could not coordinate prices, intermediaries
overcome the anticommons deadweight losses, providing a benefit for society as well as for the
owners.243
C.

Trademark Law
1. Legal Exclusivity of Trademarks

Trademark protection prevents consumer confusion on the market, by encouraging
competitors to use distinctive marks to identify their goods and services.244 The economizing
function of a trademark or brand name is the exclusivity of the right itself. For a trademark to
have value it cannot be duplicated. Allowing another company to use the same brand would
remove the original brand’s identifying function, thereby eliminating its value.245 Much of
substantive trademark law can be explained in this light. For example, in U.S. trademark law
sales and licenses of trademarks are restricted,246 and any sale must be followed by monitoring
for quality compliance.247
Injunction is the default remedy for trademark infringements.248 Courts will weigh the
243

Opposite conclusions are reached in the case of substitutes. Here, an intermediary with independent price-fixing
authority renders monopolistic pricing sustainable in a Nash equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium favors copyright
owners, who are able to maximize total profit from the sale of their licenses, as would happen in a cartel. But such
coordination is socially inefficient compared to the alternative competitive (or oligopolistic) equilibrium, since it
prevents beneficial competition with the creation of a social deadweight loss.
244 See, for example, the United States federal trademark statute (The Langham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60
Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127 (1994). See, e.g., with regard to European
Community Trademarks: proprietors are entitled to “prevent the use, in the course of trade, of signs which are
identical or similar to the CTM in relation to goods or services which similar to those covered in the registration”.
Article 5(2) Council Regulation (E.C.) No.40/90 on the Community Trademark, [1995] O.J. OHIM 50. See, also,
First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Trade Marks (O.J. EC No L 40 of 11.2.1989, p. 1).
245 Possible costs of trademarks are that they induce owners to spend on advertising and the promotion of a
spurious image of high quality that enables monopoly rents by deflecting consumer from lower price but equal
quality substitutes. The conception of trademarks as artificial monopoly has largely been discredited in the economic
literature. It is often assumed that consumers are willing to pay a premium for the assurance that a product with a
certain chemical formula will be actually manufactured along the formula. William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269, 274-275 (1987).
246 Sale in gross is prohibited, see Langham Act 15 U.S.C. 1060 (1994). By contrast, most European countries
allow the assignment of trademarks, even without transfer of the underlying business. The Registry Office can
refuse the transfer if it would lead to consumer confusion regarding the trade origin of the good or services. See GUY
TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 294 (2nd ed., 2002). This also applies to community trademarks
(CTM). A CTM can be assigned “separately from any transfers of the undertakings”. Article 17 Council Regulation
(E.C.) No.40/90 on the Community Trademark, [1995] O.J. OHIM 50.
247 See MERGES, ROBERT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 698-99 (1997);
Mark Lemley, The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 134-35 (1999).
248 In the case of dilution, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (Supp. IV 1994): “The owner of a famous mark shall be
entitled only to injunctive relief...”. O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies, supra note__ , 1146-47: “injunction is the
weapon primarily designed to enforce the property right to exclude established under the Patent and Copyright Acts
and to protect the public from confusion under the Lanham Act. The injunction, common in intellectual property
cases, may be used at virtually any stage of the proceedings to stop infringement.” (footnotes omitted). On the
conflict between property rule-protection of copyright law and the Fist Amendment see, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
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individual facts of the case and consider whether equity demands an injunction, taking into
consideration factors such as intent, public interest considerations,249 legislative intent, harm
suffered by the plaintiff, balance of hardship, etc. Because “irreparable injury is presumed” when
a plaintiff “demonstrate[s] a likelihood of success on [its] trademark infringement claim,” courts
regularly issue preliminary injunctions prohibiting the further display and other uses of the
infringing trademark.250
2. The Social Costs of Trademarks
Do trademarks raise concerns from the viewpoint of economic fragmentation?
To a certain extend trademark owners can prevent the use of a mark in criticism or comedy
pieces by artists, authors and political groups, news agencies, and so forth. Some have held that
the threat of litigation by trademark owners may “have a chilling effect in speech that happens to
involve trademarks”251 and thus hands control of the shape of discourse in the hand of few.252
Familiar words cannot be used widely for political and social commentary and are no longer
freely subject to humor or criticism.253
Others believe that the costs of exclusivity over words and symbols hardly outweigh the
benefits for consumers. As one commentator notes “the English language has more than one
million words, most of which are under-utilized and wide-open, and each year probably more
new words are being created freely than subtracted commercially.”254
The anticommons problem is largely reduced when one considers trademark law’s
provisions on “generic trademarks”. The trademark law doctrine of generic marks restricts
exclusive control on both an ex-ante and ex-post level. Trademark protection is terminated when
the value of trademark become so commonplace that it attains the status of a “generic”
trademark.255 Under this restriction a word cannot and will no longer be adopted as a trademark
when the term refers or has primarily become to understood by the consuming public as referring
to a product category.256 This preempts many of the public discourse concerns regarding the
excessive control rights of trademark owners in public discourse.
E.

Current Issues in Intellectual Property Law

YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
249 See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1989).
250 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D.Cal. 2000) aff'd.
without opinion, 246 F.3rd 675 (9th Cir. 2000).
251 Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note__, 1712. Trademark law may also shape the portrayal of our
landscapes. Landowners have claimed trademark rights in their buildings to protect the design of these buildings, to
prevent uncompensated depiction of these buildings in whatever form. See in this regard the trademark granted to
the facade of the New York Stock Exchange or the litigation on the shape of a golf course. Id., 1712, notes 136-140.
(with a reference to the relevant trademarks and case law).
252 Id.
253 Id., 1696.
254 Eli Noam, Two Cheers for the Commodification of Information 54 in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION
(Niva Elkin-Korin,& Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., 2002).
255 The classic treatment is Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323
(1980) (proposing an improved economic test for evaluating genericism).
256 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). See also Article 3(1) (a) and (d) of the European Union Trademark Directive.
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The previous section underlines the wide-ranging effects of the expansion of intellectual
property rights in copyright, patent and trademark law. This Section further documents the close
connection between the issue of fragmentation and the various questions that are at stake in the
policy debates that currently surface in the field of intellectual property rights.
This Section highlights two current issues in the societal debate of intellectual property: the
appropriate role of patent protection in genetic and biomedical material, and the protection of
internet business methods. Both these issues are prime examples where underlying economic
conditions have pushed the expansive boundaries of patent law.
1. Patents on Genetical and Biotechnological Material: From Public to Private Ownership
of Organisms and Information
Prior to the 1980’s, living organisms, even when modified, were equated with “products of
nature.”257 This definition of biotechnological or genetic material as non-patentable subject
matter, held most genetic material firmly outside of the sphere of patent law.258
More recently, changes in economic undercurrents and the role of such research259 - has
placed pressure on the legal system, the courts in particular, to acknowledge patent claims
primarily based on to discoveries of DNA sequences.260
Gradually, and decisively after Diamond v. Chakrabarty,261 patents have been issued on
257 See, e.g., In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1294 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (a strain of micro-organisms found in a soil
sample).
258 A genome is the comprehensive genetic make-up of an organism, compromised of DNA
(Deoxyribonucleicacid). Discoveries of DNA sequences contain cloned genes that enable the production of proteins
through recombinant DNA technology.
259 Research in genetic material has surged over the past decade. In 1990 the United States launched the Human
Genome Project (funded by the Department of Energy, and the National Institutes of Health) which intended to
identify all genes that constitute our genome, and to determine the sequence of the genome’s chemical bases and to
license the pursuant related technologies in the private sector. As of June 2000, the Working draft of the genome has
been available (completed in 2002). The availability of a genome sequence has provided a challenging and unique
opportunity of further research towards the linking of new data to medical explanations for diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes. The potential development of new therapeutics and diagnostic and commercially successful
products and applications opened the horizon of research in this area. With the availability of the sequence, research
now begins to analyze the raw sequence to determine the parts of the genome that encode genes, the areas of
transcription, and the functional products that the genes encode. It is such research that hopes to bring to the fore the
downstream commercial applications that might revolutionize and medical treatments. For further information, see
Five-Year Plan Goes to Capitol Hill, HUMAN GENOME NEWS (U.S. Dep’t of Energy/ Nat’l Insts. Of Health), May
1990, available at <<http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/ project/about.html>>. Research into life forms such as agricultural
patents has diverse applications, including food consumption, genetically engineered plants and organisms, nature of
agriculture new medication, test, and environmental disease.
260 In 2001 twenty to fifty-thousand gene patents were pending for review at the patent office. Bradshaw, supra
note__, 640. The American Patent Office has attempted to slow down the tide of EST applications by issuing a set
of Utility Examination Guidelines on January 5, 2001, The utility requirement states that “whoever invents or
discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor...” 35 U.S.C. 101.
261 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) the Supreme Court validated a patent claim on human made,
genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil. This case
compounded the judicial treatment of artificial variants of naturally occurring substances. It cleared the way for the
patent protection of biotechnological innovations such as genetically modified organisms and proteins. Patent
applications for biotechnological and genetic material need to comply with patent law’s minimum standards of
novelty, non-obviousness, utility and enablement. Also in Europe the protection to biotechnological inventions has
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isolated and purified DNA sequences (separate from the chromosome in which they occur in
nature) and on DNA sequences spliced into recombitant vectors or introduced into recombinant
cells of a sort that did not exist in nature.262 Subsequently, patents have been granted on a variety
of biotechnological products and processes.263 In effect, patents on the gene of such protein
provide exclusivity in the market for the protein.264
Most recent technological advancements have structurally altered the design of research in
the field of genetics and genomics.265 Instead of cloning particular genes, the research and
development objective has shifted to the more ambitious task of sequencing entire genomes.266
This represents a shift in the innovation (and patent) specter from new chemical entities to new
scientific information.267 More below on this paradigmatic shift in genetic research.
Due to technological advances, information itself has retained important commercial
value,268 increasing the stakes in the assignment of rights to the information. From an
evolutionary perspective, the drive for “propertization” can thus be readily explained in reference
to the evolutionary theory developed in Section 5.2.3.2. New scientific-technological advances
provided economic opportunities in the development of pure genetic information. Because
genetic information became a valuable commodity, demands for property right protection arise
in earlier stages of the innovation process.
a. Information Patents and Anticommons Dangers
Awarding patent claims on information itself, as opposed to the product assembled on the
basis if this information, is a significant departure from the traditional understanding of the
patent system. Under the conventional bargain of patents, patent law provides exclusivity in the
products that are based on the information itself.269 A monopoly right is awarded in return for the
disclosure of that information and the free use of the information about the invention for the

been strengthened. After much back and forth between the European Commission and the European Parliament, a
Directive was adopted on the protection of biotechnological inventions. See Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, [1998] O.J. L.213/13.
262 Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__., 786.
263 Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process
is patentable, even if it previously existed in nature. See EPC Revised version, Article 23e(1).
264 This similar to a chemical compound that is vital to a drug.
265 Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__, 784.
266 A patent holder’s right to exclude other from using a specific set of intangible genetic information patens
traditionally covers genetic information in a physical form, such as molecules of DNA (deoxyribonucleic, RNA
(ribonucleic) or proteins. See Bradshaw, supra note__.
267 Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__, 785. For an in depth treatment, see John M. Golden, Biotechnology,
Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101
(2001). Golden calls for continued government involvement and investment in innovation, coupled with a stricter
enforcement of the utility requirements as a condition for patentability.
268 The commercial value of abstract genetic information has changed over time. “In the early days of patenting
genes, the commercial value of genetic information derived not from the control of the information itself, but from
control over its embodiment in the form of a tangible composition of matter - i.e. proteins.” Bradshaw, supra note__,
641 (new genetic information discovery is routine, as is the issuance of gene patents).
269 On the social and ethical questions of genetic research, see e.g. E.R. GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996); T. Caulfield & Williams-Jones, THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES (1999).
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purpose of innovation, rather than use of the tangible invention itself.270 This establishes private
rights of exclusion into information, while previously only the concrete output of the information
was included in the patent bundle of rights.271 The disclosure requirement of patent law is
defeated when patent rights are granted in the information itself. Awarding exclusivity in the
information itself, even when contained in computer-readable media, is especially problematic
because patent law’s absence of safeguards such as fair use, reverse engineering, and the more
limited experimental usage exception of patent law.
The fragmentation effect of this shift is highlighted in the case of genome companies. The
genomic industry seeks commercial applications for genome data. It invests in discovering and
patenting genes that are useful for the development of commercially viable products. Their
business consists of selling the access rights to sequence information, drugs, diagnostic tools, and
development. In these cases property rights are established at a very early stage.272
Yet, genetic research is a “cummulative endeavor. The work of downstream researchers
depends on access to upstream discoveries.”273 This especially rings true in the field of
genomics. Given the fragmented nature of the research industry, downstream products are likely
to rest upon various material subject to private property rights in the portfolio of various
individual right holders.
The anticommons problem is especially daunting in the EST field, where gene fragments
have been patented without any knowledge as to their biological function. “Patent holders of
these fragments own overlapping sections of the same gene. Creation of commercially viable
270 The large costs of research and development are held as the primary justification for the patent system.
Production costs of a new drugs using chemicals to pharmaceuticals average 500 million U.S. dollars. See THE
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE:
R&D THE KEY TO INNOVATION. Available at <<http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications>>. See also
Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__, 797. Patent rights address the considerable gap between (1) up front cost
of developing and establishing a valuable and proven drug onto the market, and (2) the lower costs of copying a
drug, by allowing the innovator to enjoin competitors from all use of the claimed invention, and enabling above
market prices during the statutorily provided period of monopoly. See generally on innovative development, Richard
C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 247-75 (E. Mansfield & E. Mansfield, eds., 1993); D.C. Mowery & N. Rosenberg,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 293-94 (1989). But see R.E. Gold, Biomedical Patents
and Ethics: A Canadian Solution, 45 MCGILL L.J. 413, 423 (2000) (Gold argues that the incentive based
justifications of patents are “mere acts of faith based on uncertain or self-serving empirical evidence”).
271 The patenting of genetic material has received criticism. There is a recognition that market failures in the
transfers will be costly. See Gregory Beals, Who Will Own the Code of Life?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 67.
272 Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome’s Trust Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public Domain and the
Potential for Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 150 (2001). Compare Arti Kaur Rai,
Forum: Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 707 (2001).
On the extensive patenting that goes on at major research universities, pointing to a norm that disfavours private
property rights in high upstream research, such as gene fragments (ESTs) of unknown function. See also Robert P.
Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, Summer 1996 SOC. PHIL. &
POL. 145 (1996) (describing science as a limited access commons that combines sharing norms among pure
scientists with property rights enforcement against commercial entities).
273 The most recent innovation is the arrival of “automated high-throughput” sequencing techniques which enable
scientist to process large quantities of raw genomic data for which no use is known. Expressed Sequence Tags (EST)
are sets of chemical base pairs that identify codes for protein regions with unrevealed biological functions. The pairs
are valuable as they may lead to the code of protein products. Even the discovery of parts of gene EST genetic
research is a “cummulative endeavor, the work of downstream researchers depends on access to upstream
discoveries.” Bradshaw, supra note__, 642.
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products is likely to require the use of multiple gene fragments.”274
Property rights in genes of unknown functions are problematic. A researcher who investigates a
disease or clinical disorder in relation to a particular gene will need to seek licenses from each of
the patent right holders of the various possible explanatory ESTs or SNP’s. In cases of increased
uncertainty as to the synergetic effect of one’s own research and the to-be-licensed material, the
prospective licensee might forego the intended research. The high degree of uncertainty in the
research on gene patents of uncertain use is thus an argument against the propertization of such
subject matter, in light of the economic model of fragmentation.275
The American Society of Human Genetics describes the problem as follows:
“Normally, a patent ensures that a gene will be available for all researchers and for any company
willing to license it. We fear that in the case of ESTs it may have quite the opposite effect. An EST
patent, to be useful to the commercial sector, must make broad claims in regard to future use, including
protection for the rest of the gene and its protein product, and their use for diagnostic and therapeutic
applications. The academic community is unlikely to put major research effort into an EST-identified
gene or its protein product if someone else already has the right to license its use based on the trivial
effort required to sequence the original EST. In the commercial sector there may be reluctance to invest
heavily in further research on EST-identified genes when a small but unknown fraction of them will turn
out to have commercial utility, and when the useful ones may be contested by patents involving other
ESTs from the same gene. Genome research could end at the level of ESTs.”276

b. Safeguards Against Patents in Information
In responding to the dangers of fragmentation we may envisage devices that prevent
fragmentation (the ex-ante level) or solutions that correct some of the problems (the ex-post
level).
Ex-Ante Prevention
Several aspects of patent law might provide a counterbalance against the wasteful effects of
overfragmentation in the context of genetic research.
A gene patent provides the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the physical
molecule, but it does not preempt others from “perceiving, using, and analyzing information of
what the DNA sequence is.”277
274 Haas, supra note__, 160-61. Compare Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in
Human Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19 (2002) (property rights allow for better
protection).
275 But see Kief, supra note__, arguing that current patent law would not block full use of the gene in such
circumstances. In a response, Rai cites John Doll, Director of Biotechnology Examination at the Patent and Trade
Office (PTO): “The USPTO views this situation as analogous to having a patent on a picture tube. The picture tube
patent does not preclude someone else from obtaining a patent on a television set. However, the holder of the picture
tube patent could sue the television set makers for patent infringement if they use the patented picture tube without
obtaining a license.” See Id. with source cited in footnote 28.
276 The American Society of Human Genetics, American Society of Human Genetics Position Paper on Patenting
of Expressed Sequence Tags, November 1991<<available at http://www.faseb.org/genetics/ashg/policy/pol08.htm>>. See Adams, M.D., et al. (1991), ‘Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags and
Human Genome Project’, 252 Science 1651.
277 Bradshaw, supra note__, 642 (with reference to Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__, 788).
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A certain consensus has emerged in the patent community that genes should remain
unpatentable unless the concrete use of the genes can be described.278 As a normative collorary,
in the stage of sequencing genes, the genes will be unpatentable matter.279 The human genome
project, the international project that maps all human genes, is an interesting example of nonpatent incentive conducted research. 280
An intermediate step is to award patents that provide less extensive control rights to the
proprietor. For instance, exclusivity could be granted for more narrow aspects of the right of use
in an invention or non-exclusive license rights over a larger field of uses. Such more limited
monopoly rights would reduce the amount of exclusivity in the bundle of rights of the patent
holder, but might still suffice as incentives for biomedical investments.
Ex-Post Correction
The recent developments in genetic research have led some scholars to propose institutional
responses that counter some of the problems resulting from fragmented ownership of patent.
These institutions include open genetic database archives, cooperative cross licensing initiatives,
such as employed in the computer industry.281
Some have found in favor or more stringent regulation of the exercise of control by patent
holders.282 Others propose a registration system of EST’s, which provide a short exclusive
period, followed a period of compulsory licensing of the right to conduct research on EST,
ending with a entry into the public domain.283
c. Conclusion
For the purpose of resource allocation efficiency, the appropriate balance can not be
278 See in this regard the activities of the Wellcome Trust (WT). The WT is the world’s largest medical charity
organization, consisting of a dozen of public and private institutions involved in human genome research, with the
“aim of improving human and animal health.” At the “Strategy Meetings on Human Genome Sequencing” in
Bermuda on issues of sequencing strategy, policy, and data dissemination the Bermuda Agreement was concluded.
The most essential findings are that i) raw sequence should be freely available in the public domain, with a priority
accorded to disclosure of raw genome as soon as possible; and ii) proprietary rights should be limited to the “useful
benefits derived from genetic information”. See The Human Genome Organisation, Summary of Principles Agreed
at the International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing, Feb. 25-28, 1996), available online at
<<http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/ hugo/bermuda.htm>>). See also The Wellcome Trust, The Human Genome: What is
the Next Step?, available online at <<http://www.welcome.ac.uk/en/ genome/nextstep.html>>. See also Haas, supra
note__, 163.
279 Gold, supra note__.
280 For a critical examination of the proof of the stimulating effect of patens on investment levels, citing the Human
Genome project as a counterexample. See Gold, supra note__, 428. In a recent project, pharmaceutical companies
have contributed half of the budget for a public-private venture that is putting SNP research into the public domain.
See NicholasWade, Ten Drug Makers Join to Find Genetic Roots of Disease, NEW YORK TIMES, April 15, 2002
(cited in Rai, supra note__, 712 at footnote 35).
281 Bradshaw, supra note__, 659 (finding in favor of regulation of gene patent law at the post-issuance stage).
282 Id.
283 See Haas, supra note__, 163. The analysis of copyrights collectives, in Section 5.3.4.4 of this Chapter applies to
this proposal. But see discussion in Section 5.3.3.4: “Unlike copyrighted works, patents do not lend themselves well
to pooling by intermediaries. Licensing patents in bulk is extremely difficult because of the more complicated nature
of patents and inventions. Especially improvements are hard to categorize”.
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determined by comparing a system of patent law protection (innovation is encouraged but with
anticommons costs) to a system where there is no patent protection (lowered incentives for
investment but no anticommons losses). Rather the correct comparison is between a system of
patent protection and an alternative system of trade secrecy where there is no (protected)
disclosure and where independent invention is predominant. More generally, the absence of
patent law, the protection of investment will be obtained via alternative means. This is
exemplified by the research and development in the area of DNA sequencing in both the public
and private sector in the historical absence of any certainty with regard to capture of the
informational value of these investments.284
When conducting comparative institutional analysis,285 the relevant answers do not reveal
themselves though a singular comparison between “innovation with patent protection” versus
“innovation without patent protection” but rather, follow from measuring “innovation with patent
protection” versus innovation under alternative means of protection.
The economic model of fragmentation details some of the problems that might occur in
when attempting to reunify information fragments that are held by separate individuals. As such
the economic theory of fragmentation deserves recognition as one important part of the patent
puzzle. The issue demands further empirical investigation of the market of licensing and the
incentive effects of patents.
2. Business Methods
a. The Extension of Patents to Methods
Most recently United States patent doctrine has begun to treat business methods as
patentable subject matter.286 Originally, business methods were regarded outside of the scope of
intellectual property law. Business methods were considered as non-statutory subject matter or
rejected because of lack of novelty, non obviousness or business method exception.287
284 Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note__, 795.
285 See generally, Neil K. Komesar, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
286 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). State Street concerned a system that enhanced sale effects and tax benefits by pooling individual mutual
funds’ assets into larger partnership-based investment portfolios. For a critique, see Larry A. DiMatteo, The “New”
Problem of Business Method Patents: The Convergence of National Patent Laws and International Internet
Transactions, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.1 (2002); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The
Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L. J. 61 (1999) (business patents do not engender economic incentives and might deter diffusion of those
methods). See also Amm Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New,
Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2000);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L. J. 263 (2000); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577 (1999); Richard H. Stern, Scope-ofProtection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 105 (1999); John R. Thomas (1999), The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 3 (1999) (the strict application of the industrial application requirement can restore the
balance by limiting patent protection to repeatable production and transformation of material objects); John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B. C. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
287 See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (methods of doing business
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Because of the low entry barriers for conducting business online, business methods have
become crucial assets for attracting customers on line. Patents on these business methods provide
far-stretching rights of exclusivity and exclusion in business models. The “reverse auction”
patent of Priceline.com provides its owner with exclusivity over all business methods that use a
pricing systems in which buyers propose a price and supplier auction bid for the supply of the
good/service at that price. Patents such as held by Netcentives provides exclusivity to frequentbuyer programs on the Internet, the Cybergold patent monopolizes pay-per-view advertising.288
To many, this turnaround in the treatment of business methods289 is yet another significant
step towards the enclosure of the public domain in the wake of the information economy.290 It
has been argued that granting business methods fits within a broader extension whereby
considerations of secondary factors such as the financial success of a commercialized invention,
the number of licenses that have been issued on the method, and so forth.291
b. Anticommons Concern
Because business method patents place severe restraints on the business conduct of
competitors, actual and potential,292 they carry the potential of turning the “superhighway of
electronic commerce...into a toll road.”293 The anticommons danger in this respect is
considerable.294 The Sightsound.com patent, for instance, has the potential of preventing the sale
of any digital audio and or video recording over the Internet, if upheld in court.295 The problem
is compounded by the dynamic nature of the Internet.296
are ineligible for patent protection). Loew's Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1949) (scheme for parking automobiles in an open lot); Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App.
1988) (accounting analysis of expenses); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,296 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(method of competitive bidding on multiple items).
288 These examples are borrowed from Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should
Patent Law Play?, 4 VA. L. REV. 9, 13 (1990).
289 Some attribute this expansion to the protection of software, which empowered creative lawyers to push the limit
by acting in the presence of computer technology by describing business methods as new combinations of hardware
and software, see Merges, supra note__, 586 (proposing structural changes to the PTO, such as a competitive
application process).
290 Grusd, supra note__ (courts should align prior doctrine with policy concerns when evaluating patent claims in
internet business methods).
291 For a discussion, see Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economics Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1988) (the focus on secondary factors tends to reward non-technical
achievements and undermines the patent system).
292 Raskind, supra note__, 101.
293 Id., 72.
294 Grusd, supra note__, at note 63 (acknowledging the link between proliferated and diversely held business
patents and the dynamic effect of freezing the development of novel business methods).
295 Id., at note 27.
296 On the problematic nature of strong intellectual property protection on the Internet, see Lessig: “There is
growing skepticism among academics about whether such state-imposed monopolies help a rapidly evolving market
such as the Internet. What is “novel”, “nonobvious” or “useful” is hard enough to know in a relatively stable field. In
a transforming market, it’s nearly impossible for anyone - let alone an underpaid worker in the U.S. Department of
Commerce who spends on average of eight hours evaluating the prior art in a patent and gets paid based on how
many he processes - to identify what’s “novel”. Costly mistakes get made. On average it takes $1.2 million to
challenge the validity of a patent, which means it is often cheaper simply to pay the royalties than to establish that
the patent isn't deserved. “Bad patents” thus become the space debris of cyberspace. Nowhere is this clearer than in
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c. Making Sense of the Property Rights in Business Methods
Because entry barriers are so low in cyberspace, it becomes hard to distinguish oneself from
the abundance of competitors, which leaves the pioneer with a strong first-mover advantage.297
The information paradox298 increases the importance of being the first on Internet product or
service markets. This reduces the need for patent protections; inventors have due incentives to be
the pioneering innovator.
On the other hand, licensing is more problematic in the context of business methods.
Because the lines between different markets are blurred in the realm of e-commerce, licensing
will be conducted in a less friendly environment. See in this regard the recent lawsuit between a
retail giant and on-line bookstore.299 Such lawsuits are indicative of the exercise of strategic veto
rights in valuable resource, which has led commentators to propose limits on injunctive remedies
for business methods.300

V. CONCLUSION
The theory of legal evolution, developed in this Article, holds that private property right
allocations in intellectual property goods result from changes in economic values that stem from
the development of new technology and the opening of new markets. The uncertainty as to
successfulness of technology in protecting or circumventing protection of intellectual goods
leads to increased efforts of legislative and judicial capture by both content providers and
consumers. This technological uncertainty feeds into legal uncertainty with regard to the
applicability of current intellectual property laws and the necessity of new legal rules. In
the context of business-method patents. At a recent conference in Israel, I watched as a lawyer terrified the
assembled crowd of Internet startups with stories of the increasing number of business-method patents that now
haunt Internet space. Patent No. 5,715,314, for example, gives the holder a monopoly over “network-based sales
systems” - we call that e-commerce. Patent No. 5,797,127 forms the basis for Priceline.com and effectively blocks
any competitor. Patent No. 4,949,257 covers the purchase of software over a network.” Lawrence Lessig, The
STANDARD,
April
23,
1999;
available
at
Problem
With
Patents,
THE
<<http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151 ,4296,00.html>> (last visited, September 25th, 2002).
297 However, insofar that the first-mover advantage is premised on network or lock-in effects the remarkable
economic downturn of the information technology industry over the course of 2000-02 seems to have falsified such
a theory. For a theoretical discussion of the exaggeration of the differences between classical and e-retailing,
including network effects, see STAN LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY (2002). Despite these
reservations, the argument remains that, given low entry barriers and abundance of unranked information, being
first, and getting name recognition can provide a huge short-term advantage. By no means does this imply long run
survival if the quality of the product or service on offering is inferior to that of competitors.
298 The information paradox, as different from Arrow’s Information paradox, refers to the condition where an
individual is overwhelmed with information, while unable to locate information that is of import/interest. The
paradox lies with the reduced level of information relative to the higher availability of that information In the realm
of corporate consulting a popular application of the information paradox is the positive correlation between
increased levels of investment by companies in cutting-edge information technology, and the reducing grasp on the
efficiency of these investments. See JOHN THORP, THE INFORMATION PARADOX (1999).
299 Grusd, supra note__, 61: “traditional lines demarcating different industries erode on the Internet”. See also M.
Bolton, Wal-Mart Agrees to Settle Law Suit against Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1999, at C6.
300 Raskind, supra note__, 103.
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determining the proper scope of intellectual property law, intellectual property users and
developers are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Holders of intellectual property law will claim
that the new technology falls within the existing bundle of the intellectual property right, while
end users assert that the technological change is so significant that contemporary intellectual
property laws do not apply. The resulting social mechanism predicts a cyclical back and forth of
the legal allocation of use rights between producers and users; of which the outcome is often
contingent upon one’s interpretation of the technological state of the art. Finally, as a matter of
allocative efficiency, there exists considerable friction between the ‘multi-component’ or
complementary nature of works and the continued extension of property right-protection to
increasingly smaller units of intellectual and scientific creation. Economic theory reveals the
problematic societal consequences that may develop in the wake of unbounded fragmentation of
property rights.
Rewarding creation and innovation with the allocation of temporary property rights is the
time-honored approach to these developments. The legislative or judicial conception and
assignment of these new property rights are a crucial matter of social ordering. The outcome of
this process determines the control rights in the interaction between new technology and
intellectual property content. This Article suggests that society benefits from qualified
conceptions of property rights in intellectual property law. However, as the anticommons model
demonstrates, the uncoordinated exercise by right holders of their exclusion rights might lead to
sub-optimal levels of production. Doctrines of fair use, blocking patents, equivalent patents, and
generic trademarks serve as important points of moderation of the deadweight losses that might
ensue when dealing with the uncoordinated exercise of control rights over complementary
property rights. Practices of price coordination and mergers resolve strategic pricing problems
involving complements. In light of the anticommons problem these doctrines and institutions
retain importance as tools that work to the advantage of both producers and consumers of
intellectual property material.
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